Victor Parsons v. Charles Ryan
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 10466
| 9th Cir. | 2014Background
- Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) operates statewide, centralized policies for medical, dental, mental-health care and isolation for ~33,000 inmates; Director Ryan and interim Health Services Director Pratt sued in official capacities.
- Plaintiffs: thirteen inmates + Arizona Center for Disability Law allege systemic Eighth Amendment violations (deliberate indifference) from ADC policies and practices (e.g., understaffing, delays/denials of care, medication failures, substandard dental care, inadequate suicide prevention, severe isolation conditions).
- Plaintiffs supported class-certification with a 74‑page complaint, hundreds of ADC/Wexford documents, and four unrebutted expert reports documenting statewide deficiencies and staffing shortfalls.
- District court certified (Rule 23) a class for health care (all prisoners now/future subject to ADC medical/mental/dental policies) and a subclass for isolation (defined by 22+ hours/day confinement or certain housing), identifying 10 classwide health practices and 7 subclass isolation practices.
- Defendants primarily argued individualization precludes commonality and that written policies (some newly revised) govern; they submitted minimal factual rebuttal and no expert counter‑reports.
- Ninth Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion and affirmed class and subclass certification, holding systemic claims about exposure to risk satisfy Rule 23(a)(2), (a)(3) and Rule 23(b)(2).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) — do class members share common questions answerable in one stroke? | Parsons: ADC’s centralized, uniform policies and practices expose all inmates to a substantial risk of serious harm; the constitutionality of each specified statewide policy can be adjudicated classwide. | Ryan: Eighth Amendment healthcare and confinement claims are inherently individualized; Wal‑Mart bars class treatment because disparate circumstances among inmates prevent common answers. | Affirmed. Court: systemic, future‑risk Eighth Amendment claims can present common contentions (yes/no) about specified statewide policies; commonality satisfied. |
| Typicality under Rule 23(a)(3) — are named plaintiffs’ claims typical of class? | Plaintiffs: Named inmates allege same injury (exposure to systemic risk) from same defendant policies; not necessary to be identically injured. | Ryan: Variation in named plaintiffs’ past injuries and needs undermines typicality and invites individualized defenses. | Affirmed. Typicality met because named claims are co‑extensive with class theory (same course of conduct and similar injuries). |
| Adequacy of Rule 23(b)(2) — is injunctive/declaratory relief appropriate for the class as a whole? | Plaintiffs: Uniform systemic policies produce classwide exposure; remedial injunctive relief (staffing, screening, chronic care, emergency response, medication, etc.) would provide relief to all class members. | Ryan: Any injunction would be too abstract or require individualized remedies; plaintiffs must provide detailed remedial plan. | Affirmed. Rule 23(b)(2) appropriate: single injunction can address the systemic policies applicable to whole class; detailed remedy can be refined later. |
| Evidentiary sufficiency at certification — did plaintiffs present enough proof of systemic policies? | Plaintiffs: Complaint, extensive internal ADC/Wexford documents, and four unrebutted expert reports provide significant proof of statewide policies/practices and risk. | Ryan: Plaintiffs’ proof is insufficient; reliance on anecdotal incidents and outdated/individual examples cannot show systemwide policy. | Affirmed. Court finds plaintiffs’ evidence (including unrebutted expert reports and internal documents) sufficient at certification stage; defendants failed to rebut. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (commonality requires a common contention answerable in one stroke)
- Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (Eighth Amendment forbids deliberate indifference to substantial risk of future harm)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (deliberate indifference to substantial risk of serious harm violates the Eighth Amendment)
- Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (distinguishes systemwide Eighth Amendment claims from isolated individual claims; systemic deficiencies can support injunctive relief)
- Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013) (courts may consider merits to the extent relevant to Rule 23 analysis)
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference framework for medical-care claims)
- Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001) (policy/practice challenges that affect all class members inform typicality/commonality analysis)
- Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1985) (recognizes systemic prison‑condition claims raising risk to multiple inmates)
