Vicky McKenna v. Baylor College of Medicine, 01-15-00090-CV

Background

Vicky McKenna (white, age 48) worked as a midlevel provider for Baylor College of Medicine from 2008 until termination in October 2011 for cumulative performance deficiencies (delinquent chart reviews, low productivity, lateness) and misconduct at a termination meeting.
October 7, 2011 incident: failed to sign out a patient, used profane language in front of patients, and carried a water bottle in a patient-care area (policy/OSHA violation).
October 31, 2011 termination meeting: McKenna allegedly became disrespectful, slammed doors, pointed a finger at a supervisor, and was escorted off premises; HR reclassified termination from performance-based to misconduct (ineligible for rehire).
McKenna filed an EEOC charge (March 2012) and later sued alleging race and age discrimination (TCHRA), libel (statements to colleagues, termination letter, TWC statements), and breach of contract (promise of 30 days pay and alleged unpaid 12-hour shift).
Trial court granted Baylor’s traditional and no-evidence summary judgment on all claims except a back-pay claim, which McKenna later nonsuited; Baylor appealed and seeks affirmation of summary judgment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Was summary judgment proper on discrimination (race/age)?	McKenna contends she was singled out and subjected to age-related comments; she alleges disparate treatment and pretext.	Baylor argues termination was for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons (performance + misconduct) and McKenna cannot show pretext or nearly identical comparators.	Summary judgment affirmed: employer offered legitimate reasons; plaintiff failed to raise fact issue of pretext or comparable employees.
2. Was summary judgment proper on libel?	McKenna claims Garey email, termination letter, and TWC statements defamed her.	Baylor contends statements were true/substantially true, were qualifiedly privileged, and libel claims are time-barred; McKenna offered no evidence of falsity or actual malice.	Summary judgment affirmed: plaintiff did not dispute truth, claims barred by limitations, and communications protected by qualified privilege (no malice shown).
3. Did McKenna’s libel claims relate back to save limitations?	McKenna invokes relation-back to her original discrimination pleading to avoid limitations.	Baylor argues libel claims arise from separate post-termination occurrences and thus do not relate back under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §16.068.	Relation-back rejected: libel claims are factually distinct and time-barred.
4. Was there an enforceable contract for 30 days’ pay (breach of contract)?	McKenna asserts Baylor promised 30 days salary/benefits as consideration for staying off premises / not contacting colleagues.	Baylor argues no mutual consideration; alleged promise is contradicted by McKenna’s deposition and lacks evidentiary support.	Summary judgment affirmed: lack of consideration and no admissible evidence of the alleged promise.

Key Cases Cited

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden-shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination claims)
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (U.S. 2003) (no-rehire policy as legitimate, non-discriminatory reason)
Randall’s Food Markets, Inc. v. Davis, 891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1995) (truth is a complete defense to defamation; qualified privilege principles)
Chandler v. CSC Applied Techs., LLC, 376 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012) (summary judgment in employment discrimination context; management need not make perfect decisions)
Anderson v. Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys., 458 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015) (application of McDonnell Douglas and proof requirements for discrimination)
Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. 2014) (actual malice definition in defamation context)
Baker Hughes Oilfield Ops., Inc. v. Williams, 360 S.W.3d 15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011) (analysis of pretext and comparator evidence in discrimination cases)