Vicki Jo Clemons v. State of Indiana
2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 371
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- On July 12, 2015 Vicki Clemons struck neighbor Margaret Willoughby with a metal rod, causing a fractured wrist and significant pain; Willoughby called 911.
- State charged Clemons with Level 5 felony battery with a deadly weapon and Level 6 felony battery resulting in moderate bodily injury; jury convicted on both counts; Level 6 merged into Level 5.
- Trial court gave parties proposed jury instructions (no objections) but did not define the statutory term “serious bodily injury.”
- Jury was instructed on the definition of “deadly weapon” but not on the statutory definition of “serious bodily injury”; the rod’s size/weight was described at trial.
- Sentence: two years suspended to probation; a standard probation condition prohibited associating with persons “of bad character or reputation” or those likely to influence commission of crime.
- On appeal Clemons argued (1) omission of a “serious bodily injury” jury definition was fundamental error and (2) the probation association condition was impermissibly vague.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether failure to instruct jury on statutory definition of “serious bodily injury” was fundamental error | Clemons: omission deprived jury of necessary legal standard to decide whether the rod was a deadly weapon and thus was fundamental error | State: serious bodily injury is not an element; jurors can use common sense to find that a heavy metal rod is readily capable of causing serious bodily injury | Majority: No fundamental error — under the facts a metal rod is obviously capable of causing serious bodily injury; jury could rely on common sense |
| Whether probation condition prohibiting association with persons of “bad character or reputation” is unconstitutionally vague | Clemons: terms (associate, bad character or reputation, likely to influence) are subjective and fail to put her on notice what conduct risks revocation | State: condition is standard and within trial court’s discretion to protect public safety | Court: Condition is impermissibly vague; reversed in part and remanded for clarification |
Key Cases Cited
- Hall v. State, 937 N.E.2d 911 (discussing waiver of instructional objections)
- Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274 (describing the narrow, "daunting" fundamental error standard)
- Absher v. State, 866 N.E.2d 350 (elements of fundamental error analysis)
- Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748 (quoted on fundamental due process denial)
- Whitfield v. State, 699 N.E.2d 666 (whether an object is a deadly weapon assessed by actual ability to inflict serious injury)
- Martin v. State, 314 N.E.2d 60 (trial court must define technical legal terms not understood by jurors)
- Comer v. State, 428 N.E.2d 48 (discussing common usage of “serious bodily injury” in jury context)
- Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621 (instruction on “serious bodily injury” necessary to assess whether object is a deadly weapon)
- Bratcher v. State, 999 N.E.2d 864 (probation is a conditional substitute for imprisonment; court’s discretion in conditions)
- Hevner v. State, 919 N.E.2d 109 (trial court’s broad discretion to impose probation conditions)
- McVey v. State, 863 N.E.2d 434 (due process requires probation conditions be sufficiently clear)
- Hunter v. State, 883 N.E.2d 1161 (probation condition prohibiting contact with children held impermissibly vague)
- Foster v. State, 813 N.E.2d 1236 (probation condition banning possession of “pornographic” material held vague)
- Gleason v. State, 965 N.E.2d 702 (finding instrument a deadly weapon where inflicted injuries were severe)
- Timm v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1235 (flashlight found to be deadly weapon based on injuries inflicted)