Vicki Barbera v. Pearson Education, Inc., 906 F.3d 621

Pearson employed Vicki Barbera (1989–2016); Pearson had a Severance Policy disallowing severance for voluntary departures and for employees offered employment by a purchaser in a transaction (Merger/Acquisition clause).
Pearson ran Voluntary Separation Plans (VSPs) in 2013 and narrowly in Feb 17–28, 2014; Barbera was eligible for the 2014 VSP but did not opt in.
Three male employees (Zale, Ramsey, Lukasik) voluntarily left and received severance between Aug 2014 and June 2015, before Pearson decided in summer 2015 to outsource warehouses to R.R. Donnelley.
Pearson decided to transfer warehouses to Donnelley in mid–2015, gave Donnelley employee information by July, and signed the contract Oct 13, 2015 (effective Feb 29, 2016); Donnelley offered Barbera a placement.
Barbera first sought severance "later in 2015" (she admitted no evidence of requests before Sept 2015), then emailed SVP Nathanson in Jan 2016 asking to exit with severance; that email thread was lost during litigation and the court accepted Barbera’s account of its contents.
Procedurally: magistrate found spoliation but awarded limited cure (ordering certain facts taken as true); district court overruled Barbera’s objections and granted summary judgment for Pearson on Title VII sex-discrimination claim alleging denial of severance compared to male comparators; Barbera appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Pearson’s destruction of the Jan 2016 email warranted harsher discovery sanctions (including instruction that jury accept all proposed stipulations)	Barbera: destroyed emails show intent to deprive evidence; harsher sanctions needed beyond having certain facts taken as true.	Pearson: no intent to deprive; limited cure (treat specified email facts as true) was sufficient.	Court: No abuse of discretion; limited cure was adequate; no finding of intent to deprive, so additional sanctions unwarranted.
Whether Barbera established a Title VII sex-discrimination claim by showing similarly situated male comparators received severance while she did not	Barbera: three men received severance after VSPs; disparate treatment suggests sex discrimination and raises pretext due to inconsistent explanations.	Pearson: comparators are not similarly situated—timing differs and by the time Barbera requested severance the Donnelley transaction (and offer of employment) applied, invoking the Merger/Acquisition clause; differing circumstances explain decisions.	Court: Affirmed summary judgment for Pearson—comparators not similarly situated (timing and transaction/offered-job distinction); differing explanations are not inconsistent proof of pretext.

Chatham v. Davis, 839 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2016) (abuse-of-discretion review for discovery-sanctions rulings)
O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2011) (standard of review for summary judgment)
Darst v. Interstate Brands Corp., 512 F.3d 903 (7th Cir. 2008) (viewing facts in plaintiff’s favor on summary judgment)
Milligan-Grimstad v. Stanley, 877 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2017) (Title VII causation standard at summary judgment)
Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016) (all evidence must be considered together at summary judgment)
Ferrill v. Oak Creek-Franklin Joint Sch. Dist., 860 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2017) (McDonnell Douglas framework articulation)
Lauth v. Covance, Inc., 863 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2017) (definition of "similarly situated")
Khowaja v. Sessions, 893 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2018) (flexible inquiry into comparator similarity)
Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2012) (similarly situated requirement and summary judgment guidance)
Bass v. Joliet Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 86, 746 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2014) (reasonable jury standard at summary judgment)
Hanners v. Trent, 674 F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 2012) (factors for comparator analysis)