Vick v. Core Civic, 329 F. Supp. 3d 426

Background

Plaintiff Jasper Lee Vick, a Tennessee inmate with Type 1 (insulin‑dependent) diabetes, filed a pro se § 1983 suit alleging inadequate diabetic care, retaliatory and other unconstitutional conduct at TTCC and SCCF operated by CoreCivic/CCA and TDOC officials.
Vick has at least three prior dismissals under PLRA § 1915(g) ("three‑strikes"); he invokes the imminent‑danger exception based on alleged ongoing risk from inconsistent insulin administration, missed glucose checks, and irregular meal timing leading to diabetic complications.
Allegations include systemic understaffing/undertraining by CoreCivic/CCA, individual staff interfering with or failing to provide prescribed diabetic care, confiscation/withholding of medications and legal materials, retaliatory disciplinary actions, denial of religious services in the RCA pod, overcrowded medical lines, and mold exposure claims.
Court conducted PLRA initial screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A and applied Iqbal/Twombly pleading standards (liberalized for pro se). Court allowed IFP because imminent‑danger exception was satisfied at screening.
Court dismissed some claims (e.g., ADA against private CoreCivic; Rehabilitation Act claims against TDOC for lack of "solely because of" showing; due‑process taking claims where state remedies exist; disciplinary procedure claims; several defendants lacking personal involvement) but permitted merit‑based Eighth and First Amendment claims to proceed against specified defendants for further development.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) PLRA §1915(g) three‑strikes/imminent danger	Vick alleges ongoing, current risk of serious harm from inadequate diabetic care (missed glucose checks, delayed meals after insulin).	Defendants would argue prior strikes bar IFP unless danger is imminent and real.	Court found allegations sufficient to meet imminent‑danger exception; IFP granted.
2) ADA / Rehabilitation Act claims	Vick asserts failure to provide reasonable accommodations (timed insulin, glucose checks, diet, exercise).	CoreCivic as private contractor not a "public entity" under Title II; RA requires discrimination "solely because of" disability and proof of exclusion.	ADA claim against CoreCivic dismissed; Rehabilitation Act claim against TDOC dismissed for failing to plead discrimination solely because of disability.
3) Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference — corporate policy (CoreCivic/CCA)	Vick alleges CoreCivic policy of understaffing/undertraining and cost‑driven denial of care caused serious risk and injuries.	Corporate defendants require policy/custom showing; no respondeat superior; need facts tying policy to injury.	At screening, allegations were sufficient to state Eighth Amendment claims against CoreCivic/CCA and identified officials for further development.
4) Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference — individual staff	Vick alleges specific acts (improper injections, denying glucose checks, confiscation of KOP meds, overcrowded waits) showing subjective knowledge and disregard.	Defendants may contend disagreement with medical judgment, negligence, or lack of personal involvement.	Court found plausible deliberate‑indifference claims against specified medical and non‑medical staff who allegedly personally interfered with treatment; permitted to proceed. Others lacking personal involvement were dismissed.
5) First Amendment — retaliation and access to courts	Vick alleges retaliation (false tickets, property/commissary and meds taken, segregation) and confiscation/withholding of privileged legal mail that caused dismissal of cases.	Defendants argue disciplinary processes and property procedures or claim de minimis harm, or legitimate penological reasons for policies.	Retaliation claims against identified staff survived screening. Access‑to‑courts claims survived as to defendants who allegedly confiscated legal materials and caused prejudice; generalized law‑library claims in RCA pod dismissed for lack of specific prejudice.
6) Due process — disciplinary hearing & takings	Vick argues hearing was unfair (no witnesses, ineffective assistance of counsel) and property was taken.	No right to counsel in disciplinary hearings; lack of loss of liberty interest; state post‑deprivation remedies available for property loss.	Disciplinary‑process claims dismissed (no protected liberty interest or required process shown); takings/due‑process claims dismissed for failure to plead exhaustion/inadequate state remedy exhaustion.

Key Cases Cited

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must state a plausible claim)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for complaints)
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates Eighth Amendment)
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (subjective and objective components for Eighth Amendment failure‑to‑protect/medical claims)
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (limited due‑process protections in prison disciplinary proceedings)
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (liberty interest in prison discipline limited; atypical and significant hardship test)
Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal/corporate liability under § 1983 requires unconstitutional policy or custom)
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (states and state agencies are not "persons" under § 1983 for money damages)
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (state post‑deprivation remedy doctrine for negligent intentional loss of property)
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (no due‑process claim for unauthorized intentional deprivation where adequate state remedy exists)
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (municipal liability for failure to train when policy is moving force behind constitutional deprivation)
Vandiver v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 727 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2013) (failure to treat chronic, potentially fatal illness can satisfy PLRA imminent‑danger exception)