620 S.W.3d 356
Tex.2020Background
- VIA Metropolitan Transit is a statutorily authorized public transit authority operating buses in Bexar County; Curtis Meck fell and later had neck surgery after a VIA bus made an abrupt stop while he was standing and holding a strap.
- The driver, Frank Robertson, was new and supervised by a line instructor, Wanda Scott, who was onboard.
- Meck sued for negligence, alleging VIA was a common carrier that owed a "high degree of care." Trial court instructed the jury using the higher-duty definition; the jury awarded damages and the trial court entered judgment (reduced by TTCA cap).
- VIA appealed, arguing (1) it is not a common carrier or the higher-duty rule should be abandoned, (2) the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) does not waive immunity for claims under the higher duty, and (3) evidence was legally insufficient to show breach.
- The Supreme Court affirmed: held VIA is a common carrier, the TTCA waives immunity for negligence under the high-degree duty when it applies, and the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury verdict.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is VIA a common carrier? | VIA holds out transport to public, primary function is transporting people for a fee; thus owes high degree of care. | VIA not "in the business" (nonprofit, governmental), transporting is not its primary function, and it performs only governmental functions. | Yes. VIA is a common carrier; providing mass transit is its primary function and governmental status does not preclude common-carrier status. |
| Should Texas discard the high-degree-of-care distinction? | Retain higher duty because common-law history and passenger dependency justify it. | Abolish degrees of negligence; apply ordinary-reasonable-person standard as matter of fact. | Court declined to overrule precedent; also held ordinary-duty application would not change outcome on these facts. |
| Does the TTCA waive immunity for claims under the high-degree duty? | §101.021(1) waives immunity for negligence arising from operation of motor vehicles, which includes "slight negligence" under common law. | "Negligence" in the statute should mean ordinary negligence only; legislature did not explicitly reference "slight negligence." | Held the TTCA’s reference to "negligence" includes the common-law concept (including slight negligence) when the common law imposes a high-degree duty, so immunity is waived. |
| Was evidence legally sufficient to prove breach? | Yes — CCTV, Meck’s testimony, and VIA witnesses (who agreed operators should avoid hard stops, check rear, brake smoothly) support breach. | No — expert testimony required; VIA’s experts said no breach. | Evidence sufficient; expert testimony not required here and VIA’s own witnesses provided standard and permitted jury finding of breach. |
Key Cases Cited
- Speed Boat Leasing v. Elmer, 124 S.W.3d 210 (Tex. 2003) (explains common-carrier high-degree-of-care duty and primary-function inquiry)
- Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1989) (school-bus service held not a common carrier; primary-purpose test)
- City of Dallas v. Jackson, 450 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. 1970) (public municipal transit recognized as a common carrier)
- Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Conley, 260 S.W. 561 (Tex. 1924) (clarifies high degree of care is not strict or ``utmost'' liability)
- Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. 2016) (explains governmental-immunity framework and waiver must be clear)
- JBS Carriers, Inc. v. Washington, 564 S.W.3d 830 (Tex. 2018) (sets legal-sufficiency standard for reviewing evidence)