Veronza L. Bowers, Jr. v. United States Parole Commission, Warden
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13055
| 11th Cir. | 2014Background
- Veronza Bowers, serving life for a 1973 murder, was granted mandatory parole in May 2005, then the Parole Commission reopened and ultimately denied parole after Commissioner Spagnoli sent a partisan memorandum and the Attorney General requested reconsideration.
- This Court (Bowers v. Keller) vacated the June 14, 2005 reopening decision because Spagnoli’s unauthorized advocacy tainted the Commission, and directed the district court to return the case to the Commission as of May 17, 2005 and to grant relief unless the Commission acted within 60 days.
- On remand the Parole Commission reviewed the record early, re-voted in December 2011, and again denied mandatory parole based largely on a 1979 escape attempt. Bowers exhausted administrative remedies and sought discovery and leave to amend his habeas petition alleging (among other things) post-2005 political pressure and procedural/mandate violations.
- The district court denied discovery and leave to amend, reasoning the Keller mandate did not authorize further discovery and that prior appellate disposition foreclosed political-pressure claims.
- The Eleventh Circuit held the district court abused its discretion: the mandate did not preclude discovery into post-October 2005 political pressure or bar amendment; discovery and leave to amend should be allowed narrowly as to post-October-2005 political-influence allegations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court erred by denying discovery into alleged political pressure on the Parole Commission after Oct. 2005 | Bowers: unique history of bias and suspicious timing of 2011 re-vote justify discovery into post-2005 political influence | Government/District Court: Keller mandate and prior appellate rulings foreclose further discovery or relitigation of political-pressure claims | Court: District court abused its discretion; grant discovery limited to post-October-2005 political-pressure matters |
| Whether district court abused discretion by denying leave to amend the habeas petition | Bowers: new factual allegations about 2011 re-vote and post-2005 pressure warrant amendment | District court: petition already long/complicated and mandate scope limits new claims | Court: Abuse of discretion; leave to amend should be allowed absent substantial reason to deny |
| Whether the Keller mandate foreclosed all further review of Commission bias or political influence | Government: Keller affirmed denial of relief on political-pressure claim and found no evidence current Commission would be biased; thus law-of-the-case bars relitigation | Bowers: mandate ensured impartial proceedings but did not preclude discovery into subsequent events that could show new bias or pressure | Court: Law of the case precludes relitigation of pre-October-2005 matters, but does not bar inquiry into events outside prior appeal (post-October-2005) |
| Whether discovery may probe Commissioner Spagnoli’s past influence on current commissioners | Bowers: current Commission could be tainted by documents/Spagnoli’s actions | Government/District Court: speculation; no evidence current commissioners biased by Spagnoli’s documents | Court: Denied; speculation insufficient — no discovery into purging/Spagnoli’s past bias vis-à-vis current commissioners |
Key Cases Cited
- Bowers v. Keller, 651 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2011) (prior opinion finding Spagnoli tainted the Commission and issuing the mandate)
- Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997) (habeas discovery is discretionary and requires good cause)
- Arthur v. Allen, 459 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2006) (standard for habeas discovery—good cause where specific allegations show facts could entitle petitioner to relief)
- Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. Institute of London Underwriters, 430 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply to issues outside prior appeal)
- Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092 (11th Cir. 2004) (district court may abuse discretion by applying law incorrectly)
