Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell
758 F.3d 118
| 2d Cir. | 2014Background
- Plaintiffs: Vermont Right to Life Committee (VRLC), a 501(c)(4), and VRLC–FIPE, a state-registered political committee formed by VRLC to make (it claims) only independent expenditures; VRLC-PC is a separate committee that makes candidate contributions.
- Vermont statutes at issue: (1) definition and disclosure for "electioneering communications" (must identify sponsor); (2) mass-media activity reporting (reports to Secretary of State and candidates for certain communications); (3) definition of "political committee" (PAC) and associated disclosure and contribution rules; and (4) contribution limits on PACs ($2,000 per source in the then-current law).
- Procedural posture: District court granted summary judgment to Vermont on all claims; Second Circuit reviews de novo and affirms in full.
- Core factual point relevant to the as-applied contribution claim: undisputed record showed VRLC-FIPE was financially and organizationally enmeshed with VRLC-PC (overlapping officers/membership, shared activities, transfers of funds, joint production of voter guides), so it was not functionally independent.
- Remedies sought: VRLC challenged vagueness and First Amendment overbreadth/as-applied violations of the disclosure definitions; VRLC-FIPE sought to avoid contribution limits by claiming true independent-expenditure status.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Vagueness of "promotes/supports" and related electioneering/mass-media terms | Terms are vague and give inadequate notice; chill speech | Language is sufficiently precise; similar language upheld by Supreme Court | Terms are not unconstitutionally vague; statute provides fair notice (McConnell precedent applies) |
| 2) First Amendment — must regulated speech be "express advocacy" or time-targeted broadcast to trigger disclosure? | Vermont may only require disclosure for express advocacy or narrowly-tailored broadcast ads | Citizens United allows broader disclosure interests; informational interest is substantial | Disclosure/identification beyond express advocacy is permissible; statutes survive exacting scrutiny |
| 3) PAC definition — must state limit disclosure to groups whose "major purpose" is electoral? | Constitution requires a "major purpose" limitation before imposing PAC-style disclosure/registration burdens | Post-Citizens United, "major purpose" is a statutory line-drawing, not a constitutional requirement; disclosure reviewed under exacting scrutiny | "Major purpose" is not constitutionally required; Vermont's PAC definition and thresholds survive exacting scrutiny |
| 4) Contribution limits as-applied to VRLC-FIPE (independent-expenditure-only claim) | VRLC-FIPE is an independent-expenditure-only group, so contribution limits cannot apply (no quid pro quo risk) | VRLC-FIPE is not functionally independent from VRLC-PC; limits validly apply to entities that are enmeshed with contributory/coordination activity | Contribution limits upheld as applied because undisputed record shows VRLC-FIPE is enmeshed with VRLC-PC and not truly independent |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (construed federal scheme to limit disclosure/regulation to certain campaign-focused entities and to express advocacy in statutory interpretation)
- McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upheld similar terms and broader disclosure in campaign context; rejected vagueness challenge)
- Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (permitted broad disclosure regimes beyond express-advocacy and recognized informational interest)
- SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (independent-expenditure groups and the limits on contributions; influential on contribution/disclosure distinctions)
- Emily’s List v. Federal Election Commission, 581 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (discussed separation requirements between PACs and independent-expenditure entities)
- Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2004) (upheld contribution limits in contexts involving coordinated contributions/activities)