267 A.3d 647
R.I.2022Background
- Verizon appealed the Tax Administrator’s 2018 final decision upholding tangible personal property (TPP) tax assessments for 2009–2014 and denying a requested partial refund of about $21.4 million, arguing depreciation was miscalculated.
- Providence moved to intervene in the District Court, arguing municipalities receive most TPP revenue under G.L. § 44-13-13; the court granted Providence intervention as of right.
- Pawtucket and Cranston sought to intervene, adopting Providence’s filings; the trial judge denied their motions, finding Providence would adequately represent their interests.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari, remanded for the District Court to allow movants to particularize why Providence would not adequately represent them, and the District Court again denied intervention on remand.
- On appeal, the issue centered on Rule 24(a)(2) intervention-as-of-right: whether a presumption of adequate representation applied (because movants and Providence shared litigation goals) and whether movants overcame that presumption.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Pawtucket and Cranston may intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) | Movants: they have a direct financial interest in TPP revenue distributions and the District Court should consider whether existing parties (at hearing time) adequately represented them | Verizon/Providence: movants share identical litigation goals with Providence; must show adversity to rebut presumption of adequate representation | Denied — movants failed to show a cognizable difference in interests or adversity to overcome the presumption of adequate representation |
| Whether speculative settlement/clawback concerns show inadequate representation | Movants: fear a settlement or judgment could require refunds or impose budgetary harm distinct to each city | Providence/Verizon: speculation about an unsupported settlement cannot show inadequate representation; refunds and administration are governed by statute/administrative actors | Denied — speculative settlement/clawback concerns without record support insufficient to rebut presumption |
| Whether movants’ distinct fiscal priorities create a different-in-kind interest from Providence | Movants: each municipality has unique fiscal/budgetary needs affecting how revenue reductions would matter | Providence/Verizon: disparities in budgetary effect are statutory and contingent, not direct legal interests in the litigation’s legal question | Denied — interests are similar in kind and identical as to the litigation goal (upholding tax assessment) |
| Proper standard to overcome presumption of adequate representation | Movants: burden to show inadequacy is minimal (some tangible basis) | Verizon: where interests align, intervenor may need a more compelling showing of adversity or conflict | Held: middle ground — movants needed a tangible basis plus adequate explanation to overcome presumption; they did not meet it |
Key Cases Cited
- Marteg Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Review of City of Warwick, 425 A.2d 1240 (R.I. 1981) (applies Rule 24(a) test for intervention)
- Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (U.S. 1972) (low burden to show possible inadequate representation)
- Retirement Bd. v. Corrente, 174 A.3d 1221 (R.I. 2017) (presumption of adequate representation by government party and how to rebut it)
- United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d 141 (1st Cir. 1982) (presumption of adequate representation where goals align; need to show adversity, collusion, or nonfeasance)
- Daggett v. Comm’n on Gov’t Ethics & Election Practices, 172 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 1999) (government defending statute presumed to represent supporters; how to overcome presumption)
- Credit Union Central Falls v. Groff, 871 A.2d 364 (R.I. 2005) (intervenor may show a different interest in kind where it claims priority over others)
- Tonetti Enters., LLC v. Mendon Road Leasing Corp., 943 A.2d 1063 (R.I. 2008) (guidance on applying Rule 24 principles)
- Town of Coventry v. Hickory Ridge Campground, 306 A.2d 824 (R.I. 1973) (example where intervenors had unique, directly affected interests)