Venters v. Sellers, 261 P.3d 538

Venters, a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case, alleges Dr. Sellers caused his paralysis in a 2001 car accident; Venters later died and his estate was substituted as plaintiff.
Mann previously settled Venters’ auto-claim; he drafted a release note stating Venters could not sign due to paralysis.
Mann sought settlement with KaMMCO; in 2002 he signaled intent to file suit if no settlement by April 2002, with Bretz as co-counsel if needed.
In 2004, Judge Rome disqualified Bretz (imputed to Mann) based on Rice’s move from Gilliland to Bretz and information sharing; Mann was not named in the 2004 findings.
Venters pursued interlocutory appeal; proceedings included evidence about confidential information and potential conflicts; Mann subsequently appeared for Venters in 2008.
Sellers moved to disqualify Mann in 2009, arguing 2004 disqualification and Rule 3.7 necessity; no evidentiary hearing was held in 2009.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Judge Rome have a legally permissible basis to disqualify Mann in 2004?	Mann was not personally disqualified in 2004; imputed disqualification did not extend to him.	Rice’s information transfer to Bretz made Mann part of the Bretz firm; imputed disqualification should apply to Mann.	No; 2004 disqualification of Mann was not legally supported; need proper KRPC 1.10 analysis and firm-relationship facts.
Did the 2004 Bretz firm disqualification have preclusive effect on the 2009 Mann disqualification?	Preclusion doctrines apply only if there was a final merits judgment; res judicata or collateral estoppel do not apply here.	The 2004 ruling precludes relitigation of issues related to co-counsel disqualification.	Preclusion does not apply; 2004 decision did not resolve the same merits issues for Mann in 2009.
Was Mann subject to disqualification in 2009 as a witness to causation under KRPC 3.7?	Mann’s role as a referral/co-counsel should not render him a necessary witness; insufficient evidence of necessity.	Mann’s February 2001 letter and settlement conduct could make him a necessary witness on causation defense.	No; Mann was not shown to be a necessary witness under KRPC 3.7; the 2009 disqualification was improper.

State v. Gonzalez, 290 Kan. 747 (2010) (multi-layer abuse-of-discretion review; legal standards governing disqualification and res judicata)
In re Care & Treatment of Sporn, 289 Kan. 681 (2009) (res judicata applicability; final judgment on merits required)
Zimmerman v. Mahaska Bottling Co., 270 Kan. 810 (2001) (test for when factual findings must be supported by substantial evidence)
Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 266 Kan. 1047 (1999) (caution in rulings on disqualification; potential for abuse)
LeaseAmerica Corp. v. Stewart, 19 Kan. App. 2d 740 (1994) (preclusionary effects and admissibility of letters in disqualification context)
Chrispens v. Coastal Refining & Mktg. Inc., 257 Kan. 745 (1995) (burden of proof for disqualification under conflict rules rests with movant)
Waterview Resolution Corp. v. Allen, 274 Kan. 1016 (2002) (definition and limits of law of the case doctrine)
Flores Rentals v. Flores, 283 Kan. 476 (2007) (law-of-the-case considerations in agency of nuanced issues)