Venancio Aguasanta Arias v. Dyncorp
410 U.S. App. D.C. 62
| D.C. Cir. | 2014Background
- Plaintiffs are Ecuadorian provinces and individual Ecuadorian farmers who alleged that aerial glyphosate spraying in Colombia (conducted by U.S. contractor DynCorp under Plan Colombia) drifted or crossed into Ecuador causing crop, health, and economic harms.
- The original putative class action was filed in D.C. federal court in 2001; later actions filed in Florida by other plaintiffs and provinces were transferred and consolidated in D.C.
- The district court issued Lone Pine–style questionnaires requiring plaintiffs to detail exposures and injuries; many plaintiffs submitted incomplete answers despite multiple extensions and were dismissed with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
- The district court found the Ecuadorian provinces lacked Article III standing (financial injuries not shown to be fairly traceable to DynCorp) and dismissed individual plaintiffs’ crop-damage claims for lack of expert proof of general causation.
- The court also entered summary judgment that affected non-test plaintiffs; plaintiffs challenged the scope and whether some torts required expert proof.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing of Ecuadorian provinces | Provinces claim budget deficits and increased public expenditures caused by spraying establish injury and traceability | DynCorp says lost tax revenue and generalized budget harms are not cognizable or not traceable to DynCorp | Provinces lack Article III standing: lost tax revenue generally not cognizable and plaintiffs failed to show their financial harms were fairly traceable to DynCorp |
| Dismissal for failure to complete questionnaires (163 plaintiffs) | Dismissal with prejudice was an abuse; court should have used lesser sanctions | Court argues plaintiffs repeatedly failed deadlines despite extensions; dismissal justified under Rule 37(b) | Affirmed: dismissal not an abuse; court gave multiple opportunities and sanctions were appropriate |
| Requirement of expert testimony for crop-damage/general causation | Plaintiffs say glyphosate plainly kills plants so experts unnecessary | DynCorp presented unrebutted expert evidence that glyphosate does not cause the specific alleged crop effects; expert proof of general causation required where scientific causation is disputed | Affirmed: expert proof of general causation required under D.C. law when causation turns on scientific issues; crop claims dismissed for lack of general-causation experts |
| Binding effect of test-plaintiff rulings on non-test plaintiffs | Non-test plaintiffs contend they never agreed to be bound by test-plaintiff outcomes and were surprised by broad summary judgment | DynCorp points to plaintiffs’ briefing (a footnote) suggesting consent or estoppel and argues plaintiffs failed to preserve the objection below | Court rejects plaintiffs’ failure-to-preserve argument; plaintiffs did not raise timely post-judgment motion and the misleading brief made failure to preserve particularly problematic; summary judgment scope stands as to those claims preserved below |
| Claims that don't require expert proof (battery, nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional distress) | Plaintiffs argue these torts do not require proof of physical harm or expert causation and thus should survive without scientific experts | DynCorp contends expert evidence was necessary across the board | Reversed in part and remanded: district court erred in dismissing battery, nuisance, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims for lack of expert testimony; these torts can be proved without expert testimony depending on other evidence |
| Negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) | Plaintiffs argue emotional-distress claims arise from being sprayed/exposed and do not always require expert proof | DynCorp argues plaintiffs cannot show zone-of-physical-danger without expert proof of exposure/risk | Affirmed: under D.C. law NIED requires actual physical danger (zone of physical danger); expert proof needed to show plaintiffs were within that zone, so NIED claims properly dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding district court discretion to issue Lone Pine–style discovery orders)
- Sierra Club v. E.P.A., 292 F.3d 895 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (standing–traceability principles)
- Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (lost tax revenue generally not cognizable injury for standing)
- Bonds v. D.C., 93 F.3d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (sanction analysis requires consideration of lesser alternatives)
- Baltimore v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 545 A.2d 1228 (D.C. 1988) (expert testimony required where causation rests on scientific matters)
- Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (issue-preservation; need to raise post-judgment motions to preserve objections)