Velotas v. National Credit Systems, Inc., 2:10-cv-00288

Plaintiff Velotas sued National Credit Systems, Inc. for FDCPA violations and related state-law claims stemming from a single phone call in debt collection.
The case settled liability-wise on June 10, 2010; dispute remained over attorney’s fees under FRCP 54(d)(2).
Plaintiff sought fees and costs; the court awarded partial, not total, fees after considering rate and hours.
The court approved 55 attorney hours at $300/hr, 9.9 staff hours at $100/hr, and $370.27 costs, totaling $17,860.27.
Defendant argued a lower hourly rate and restricted hours, particularly contending that only post-January 7, 2010 hours were recoverable for FDCPA enforcement.
The court rejected the notion that January 7, 2010 started the fee clock and instead concluded hours prior to that date could be recoverable for enforcing liability under FDCPA.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Reasonable hourly rate for counsel	Velotas seeks $300–$350/hr; market rate evidence supports $300.	Rate of $350 is excessive; $250–$300 would be appropriate.	Court finds $300 per hour reasonable.
Reasonableness of hours expended	Total 126.54 hours; 113 attorney hours are reasonably expended for enforcing FDCPA liability.	Only hours after January 7, 2010 were reasonably expended due to amendment timing and settlement.	Court approves 55 attorney hours and 9.9 staff hours as reasonable; some hours reduced for clerical entries and vagueness.
Effect of offers of judgment on fee calculation	Offers did not cap fee recovery; fees determined by court post-settlement.	Offers approximate recovery; should cap hours to those after offer.	Court disagrees with cap; fees awarded based on post-amendment enforceable liability, not limited by offer timing.
Overall entitlement to fees under FDCPA	FDCPA provides for costs and reasonable attorney’s fee; plaintiff as prevailing party is entitled.	FDCPA case is simple; argue against large fee due to modest recovery.	Court awards $17,860.27 in fees and costs, considering the private attorney general purpose of FDCPA.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (Supreme Court, 1983) (reasonableness of hours and lodestar method; multipliers and adjustment factors)
Norman v. Houston Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1988) (reasonableness of hourly rate; interpolate market rates)
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (Supreme Court, 1984) (statutory fee-shifting; evidence of market rates; attorney fees must reflect market rates)
NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332 (11th Cir. 1987) (required evidence for market-rate fees; objective evidence > mere attestation)
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (the Johnson factors guiding fee determinations (now often considerations in lodestar adjustments))
Popham v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570 (11th Cir. 1987) (multifactor analysis for determining reasonable attorney's fees)
Tolentino v. Friedman, 46 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1995) (FDCPA fee-shifting context; private attorney general rationale)