Vela, Kenneth, 460 S.W.3d 610

Kenneth Vela was convicted of aggravated robbery (life) and possession of heroin (60 years); trial court originally ordered the heroin sentence stacked (consecutive) onto the robbery sentence.
Vela’s aggravated-robbery conviction was reversed and remanded for a new punishment hearing; at resentencing he again received life but the trial court did not reissue a stacking order.
TDCJ treated the heroin sentence as still stacked onto the robbery sentence; Vela sought habeas relief claiming the reversal/remand removed the robbery sentence from the stacking order and, absent a new stacking order, the sentences must run concurrently.
State argued the remand for punishment merely suspended the stacking relationship (sentence did not "cease to operate") and stacking resumed after resentencing; relied on Alsup (appeal does not defeat stacking).
Court analyzed Article 42.08, statutory definitions (including when a judgment "cease[s] to operate"), and precedent distinguishing appeals, punishment remands, and full retrials.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Vela)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Effect of a remand for new punishment on a prior stacking order	Remand removes the prior judgment from the stacking order so no stacking exists unless trial court reorders it	Remand merely suspends stacking; sentence did not "cease to operate" so stacking resumes after resentencing	A remand for new punishment removes the prior judgment from the stacking order; because no new stacking order was entered, sentences run concurrently

Ex parte Nickerson, 893 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding reversal and remand for a new trial removes the prior conviction/sentence for stacking purposes)
Alsup v. State, 206 S.W. 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1918) (appeal alone does not prevent trial court from ordering consecutive sentences)
Pettigrew v. State, 48 S.W.3d 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (for stacking purposes, judgment timing—when sentence imposed or suspended—determines prior/subsequent status)