623 F. App'x 290
6th Cir.2015Background
- Veasley bought 24669 Lafayette in 2004 but received a deed describing 24654 Lafayette; the mistake was later corrected and the mortgage modified to the correct description in 2005.
- In 2010 the mortgage was assigned to BAC; the assignment listed the correct street address but repeated the original erroneous metes-and-bounds description for 24654.
- Veasley defaulted; BAC foreclosed, a sheriff’s sale was held in 2011, and Fannie Mae purchased 24669 Lafayette; Veasley failed to redeem during the six-month statutory redemption period.
- Fannie Mae obtained a state-court judgment of possession and eviction in June 2012; Veasley did not timely appeal and then filed a separate suit in state circuit court seeking to set aside the sheriff’s sale; the case was removed to federal court.
- The federal district court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding Rooker‑Feldman did not bar jurisdiction but that Veasley’s claim was precluded by res judicata; the court also denied Veasley’s post-judgment motion to amend to add a redemption-process claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Rooker‑Feldman bar federal jurisdiction? | Veasley contends her claim is independent — based on a faulty assignment — not an attack on the state judgment. | Defendants argue the federal suit is a de facto appeal of the state possession judgment. | Court held Rooker‑Feldman does not bar jurisdiction because Veasley raised an independent claim about defendants’ conduct (faulty assignment) even though it overlaps with the state judgment. |
| Was the state-court possession judgment final for Rooker‑Feldman purposes? | Veasley implied the state proceedings were stayed and not final. | Defendants pointed to lapse of appeal period making the judgment final. | Court concluded the state judgment was final (appeal period expired), but nonetheless federal court jurisdiction was proper on other grounds. |
| Is Veasley’s claim barred by res judicata / §600.5750 exception? | Veasley argued defendants failed to prove the issues were actually litigated and relied on an exception for claims not litigated in summary proceedings. | Defendants argued the right-to-possession issue was actually litigated in the summary possession proceeding, so res judicata applies. | Court held res judicata bars Veasley’s claim: the right to possession was actually litigated and decided in the state summary proceeding. |
| Was denial of post-judgment leave to amend an abuse of discretion? | Veasley sought to add a redemption-process claim under Mich. Comp. Laws §600.3240(2), alleging defendants obstructed redemption. | Defendants contended the claim was known earlier, would be futile, and post-judgment amendment is improper to avoid finality. | Court affirmed denial: amendment was untimely (raised post-judgment from facts known earlier) and futile on the merits. |
Key Cases Cited
- McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing independent federal claims from forbidden attempts to review state-court judgments under Rooker‑Feldman)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (Rooker‑Feldman applies only to cases seeking review of final state-court judgments)
- Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006) (Rooker‑Feldman limited to final state-court judgments)
- Kim v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 825 N.W.2d 329 (Mich. 2012) (defects in foreclosure process render foreclosure voidable, not void ab initio)
- Sewell v. Clean Cut Mgmt., Inc., 621 N.W.2d 222 (Mich. 2001) (judgment in summary possession proceedings is conclusive on who has the right to possess the premises)