Veasey v. Perry
574 U.S. 951
SCOTUS2014Background
- Texas enacted Senate Bill 14 (SB 14), a strict photo-ID law replacing prior voter-identification rules and excluding many forms of ID previously accepted.
- The law limited acceptable photo IDs, required an Election Identification Certificate (EIC) for those lacking approved IDs, and imposing costs and travel burdens to obtain qualifying documentation.
- After a nine-day trial, the federal District Court issued a permanent injunction enjoining enforcement of SB 14, finding it violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by discriminatory purpose and effect and operated as an unconstitutional poll tax.
- The Fifth Circuit entered a stay of the District Court’s injunction; the Supreme Court (per curiam) denied applications to vacate that stay, and Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan) dissented.
- The District Court found extensive evidence of disparate racial impact, a legislative history suggesting discriminatory intent, negligible in-person voter-fraud justification, and failure to adopt less discriminatory alternatives.
- The District Court also found that Texas’s implementation and outreach were underfunded and that the State’s conduct contributed materially to voter confusion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a stay of the District Court’s permanent injunction was proper under standard stay factors | Veasey: Fifth Circuit should have applied traditional stay factors and given deference to District Court factfindings; no substantial disruption would result | Perry: State argued stay warranted to avoid electoral disruption and chaotic changes close to election | Ginsburg: Would vacate the Fifth Circuit stay — court erred by ignoring merits likelihood and District Court findings and overstating disruption risk |
| Whether SB 14 violates §2 of the Voting Rights Act (discriminatory purpose/effect) | Veasey: Law enacted with racially discriminatory purpose and will have a racially disparate effect, denying many minorities access | Perry: Law aimed at preventing fraud and preserving public confidence; benefits justify requirements | Ginsburg: District Court’s extensive record supports §2 violation based on purpose and disproportionate effect; law likely would not have been enacted absent disparate effects |
| Whether SB 14 constitutes an unconstitutional poll tax by imposing costs to vote | Veasey: All qualifying IDs impose state-imposed costs (fees, travel), functioning as a poll tax | Perry: Incidental costs are unavoidable and not equivalent to poll tax | Ginsburg: District Court correctly found SB 14 imposes a state-imposed cost at odds with Harper and functions as an unconstitutional poll tax |
| Whether concerns about election administration (Purcell principle) justify leaving SB 14 in place close to election | Veasey: Purcell does not excuse dispensing with ordinary stay standards; State had ample notice and contributed to confusion | Perry: Court should avoid altering election rules close to voting to prevent disruption | Ginsburg: Purcell requires careful consideration but does not override stay standards; here disruption risk is minimal and largely caused by State |
Key Cases Cited
- Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (courts must account for election-specific disruption but still apply traditional stay standards)
- Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm are most critical in stay analysis)
- Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (upheld Indiana voter-ID against facial constitutional challenge)
- Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (struck down poll tax as violation of Equal Protection)
- League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (observations on race and partisan considerations in Texas redistricting)
- Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2012) (three-judge court denied preclearance under Voting Rights Act §5 for Texas voter ID law)
- Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012) (findings related to Texas voting discrimination and redistricting)