Veasey v. Abbott
265 F. Supp. 3d 684
S.D. Tex.2017Background
- In 2014 the district court found Texas SB 14 (a strict photo‑ID law) had a discriminatory effect on Hispanics and African‑Americans and was enacted with a discriminatory purpose (Veasey I).
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed the results claim but remanded the discriminatory‑purpose finding for reconsideration (Veasey II) and instructed the district court to craft an interim remedy for upcoming elections.
- Parties agreed to an interim plan (required SB 14 ID or a Declaration of Reasonable Impediment (DRI) allowing a regular ballot) for the 2016 election; that did not resolve the discriminatory‑purpose claim.
- The Texas Legislature enacted SB 5 in 2017, modifying SB 14 (e.g., expanding expiration rules, mobile ID units, formal DRI with enumerated reasons and criminal penalties). Defendants argued SB 5 cured SB 14’s constitutional and VRA defects.
- The district court reconsidered in light of SB 5, denied Defendants’ motion to reconsider the discriminatory‑purpose finding, evaluated whether SB 5 remedied SB 14 under Section 2, and concluded SB 5 did not cure the violations.
- The court granted declaratory relief, permanently enjoined enforcement of SB 14 and SB 5, and declined to retain post‑judgment jurisdiction under VRA § 2 (reserving § 3(c) issues).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court should reconsider its finding that SB 14 was enacted with a discriminatory purpose in light of SB 5 | Veasey: SB 5 does not erase SB 14’s original discriminatory purpose; legislative action after liability does not negate past intent | Texas: SB 5 is a post‑enactment cure that removes the discriminatory purpose and thus should defeat reconsideration | Denied reconsideration; SB 5 does not purge SB 14’s discriminatory purpose |
| Whether SB 5 cures SB 14’s Section 2 discriminatory effects | Veasey: SB 5 leaves intact the key discriminatory features (types of ID, obstacles, DRI structure, education/training) and imposes new burdens (limited DRI reasons; enhanced perjury penalties) | Texas/DOJ: SB 5’s changes (longer expiration, mobile EICs, DRI) ameliorate SB 14’s burdens and warrant deference to the legislature | SB 5 does not fully ameliorate discriminatory effects or purpose; DRI tradeoffs and unchanged ID selection remain unlawful |
| Appropriateness of injunctive relief and scope (SB 14 alone or also SB 5) | Veasey: Full injunction needed to eliminate discriminatory legal regime and return voters to status quo ante; court should enjoin both SB 14 and SB 5 | Texas/DOJ: Court should defer to legislative remedy; if SB 5 suffices, injunctive relief is unnecessary or limited | Permanent injunction granted against enforcement of SB 14 and SB 5; court declines to craft its own photo‑ID scheme |
| Whether the court should retain jurisdiction post‑injunction under Section 2 | Veasey: No continued monitoring required for this injunction; reserve §3(c) for later | Texas/DOJ: Argued against retention as unnecessary if SB 5 cures defects | Court denied retention of post‑judgment jurisdiction under §2; reserved consideration of §3(c) relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (appellate decision affirming discriminatory‑results finding and remanding purpose claim)
- Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (district court liability opinion finding SB 14 had discriminatory effect)
- Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (framework for assessing discriminatory intent)
- United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (remedy must place victims in position they would have occupied absent discrimination)
- North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016) (upholding injunction against voter‑ID law where DRI did not cure discriminatory burdens)
- Operation Push v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991) (discusses deference to state remedial action but places burden on state to show cure)
- Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246 (11th Cir. 1987) (remedy must itself conform with Section 2)
