Veasey v. Abbott, 13 F.4th 362

Background

Texas enacted SB 14 (2011), requiring one of six government-issued photo IDs to vote; plaintiffs sued under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
The district court found SB 14 had a discriminatory effect and entered relief; the Fifth Circuit en banc (Veasey I) affirmed the discriminatory-effect finding and directed an interim remedy for the 2016 election.
On remand the district court entered an agreed interim order for 2016 (Declaration of Reasonable Impediment (DRI) procedure and acceptance of pre‑SB14 ID forms); a motions panel extended that interim remedy through 2017.
Texas enacted SB 5 (2017), modeled on the interim remedy; later proceedings produced rulings for and against permanent relief, and the Fifth Circuit (Veasey II) concluded SB 5 remedied the defects. The district court ultimately entered final judgment dismissing the case.
Plaintiffs sought attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e) (~$8.86M); the district court awarded $6.79M finding plaintiffs were "prevailing parties" based on the interim order. The State appealed only the prevailing‑party determination.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiffs are "prevailing parties" entitled to fees under §1988/§10310	The interim order (judicially sanctioned relief) materially altered the parties' legal relationship and directly benefited plaintiffs in 2016–17, satisfying Buckhannon	Interim relief was provisional or superseded by later rulings (invoking Sole/Dearmore); final dismissal defeats prevailing‑party status	Yes. The interim order met Buckhannon: judicial imprimatur, materially altered the relationship, and conferred concrete benefit; plaintiffs are prevailing parties
Whether Buckhannon three‑part test is satisfied by the interim order	The interim order was judicial relief based on an affirmed merits finding and materially changed the legal relationship for 2016–17 voters	Interim relief was temporary or procedural and should not support fees absent an enduring final victory	The court held Buckhannon's requirements were satisfied because the order was entered after merits rulings and produced lasting, concrete effects (2016–17 elections)
Whether Sole v. Wyner bars fees when preliminary relief is later undone	Plaintiffs: Sole is distinguishable because the interim order was grounded in an affirmed merits finding after full proceedings, not a hasty preliminary injunction	Defendants: Sole shows that provisional relief reversed or superseded by final judgment cannot confer prevailing status	Sole does not bar fees here—unlike Sole, the interim order rested on an upheld merits finding and was not superseded by a final merits rejection
Whether Dearmore prevents fees when defendant changes law or case is dismissed	Plaintiffs: Dearmore applies only to preliminary injunctions that induce a defendant to moot the case; not applicable here	Defendants: The later enactment of SB5 and final dismissal mean plaintiffs obtained no lasting relief and Dearmore controls	Dearmore is inapplicable: the relief here followed merits adjudication and had concrete, irremediable effects on the 2016–17 elections

Key Cases Cited

Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (judicially sanctioned relief required for prevailing‑party status)
Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (preliminary relief later superseded by final merits ruling ordinarily does not confer prevailing status)
Dearmore v. City of Garland, 519 F.3d 517 (5th Cir.) (test for prevailing status when preliminary injunction leads defendant to moot the action)
Petteway v. Henry, 738 F.3d 132 (5th Cir.) (standard of review and prevailing‑party principles)
Davis v. Abbott, 781 F.3d 207 (5th Cir.) (previous §1988/§10310 prevailing‑party analysis)
Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (affirming discriminatory‑effect finding and directing interim remedy)
Veasey v. Abbott, 888 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding SB5 remedied the defects identified in SB14)
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (plurality) (upholding voter‑ID laws and recognizing state interest in ballot integrity)
Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir.) (rejecting Section 2 challenge to photo‑ID law on results/opportunity grounds)
Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383 (9th Cir.) (rejecting Section 2 challenge where plaintiffs failed to show less opportunity to participate)
Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, 141 S. Ct. 2321 (reaffirming that §2 is not a freewheeling disparate‑impact regime and directing totality‑of‑circumstances analysis)