Veal v. State
298 Ga. 691
| Ga. | 2016Background
- On November 22, 2010, three men committed two armed robberies in Atlanta neighborhoods; one victim (Charles Boyer) was shot and killed, and another victim (C.T.) was raped; DNA linked Veal to the Grant Park sexual assault.
- Raphael Cross, a co-defendant and accomplice, identified Veal as participating in both the Virginia Highlands robbery/murder and the later Grant Park crimes; police found corroborative physical evidence (stolen phones, SUV linked to the murder) and incriminating texts.
- Veal was tried jointly with Tamario Wise, convicted of multiple counts including malice murder, rape, armed robbery, and two counts of criminal street gang activity; the trial court sentenced Veal to LWOP for malice murder plus multiple other lengthy consecutive sentences.
- Veal challenged (1) sufficiency/corroboration of Cross’s accomplice testimony for the Virginia Highlands crimes, (2) merger of gang-activity counts for sentencing, and (3) constitutionality of his LWOP sentence because he was 17½ at the time of the offenses.
- The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions, held the accomplice corroboration was sufficient, rejected Veal’s argued gang-count merger, identified one favorable merger error (vacated an armed robbery merger) and ordered correction, but vacated Veal’s LWOP malice-murder sentence and remanded for resentencing under Miller/Montgomery principles.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Veal) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency/corroboration of accomplice testimony for Virginia Highlands crimes | Cross was the sole eyewitness implicating Veal; corroboration was insufficient | Gang membership, contemporaneous similar robbery in nearby neighborhood, texts about wiping the SUV, and physical links (stolen phones) corroborate Cross | Corroboration sufficient; convictions upheld |
| Merger of criminal street gang activity counts | Veal argued the two gang-activity counts should merge for sentencing | Statute treats each enumerated underlying offense as a separate violation and crime | Counts did not merge; separate sentences allowed |
| Merger of armed robbery into malice murder (sentencing) | (raised by court on review) merger was appropriate | State implicitly argued counts are distinct | Court found trial court erred in merging Count charging armed robbery into malice murder; vacated merger and directed resentencing on that robbery count |
| Constitutionality of LWOP for juvenile (age 17½) | LWOP violates Eighth Amendment per Miller; sentencing court failed to make required findings | Trial court considered youth and case facts and had discretion under Georgia law | LWOP vacated: Montgomery clarified Miller is substantive and requires an explicit determination that juvenile is among the rare, irreparably corrupt few; remand for resentencing to allow proper findings/process |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of the evidence)
- Clark v. State, 296 Ga. 543 (corroboration of accomplice testimony doctrine)
- Alatise v. State, 291 Ga. 428 (corroboration can be slight and circumstantial)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (death penalty barred for juveniles)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (LWOP for nonhomicide juvenile offenses barred)
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (procedural requirement to consider youth before imposing juvenile LWOP)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (Miller announced a substantive rule that makes juvenile LWOP void unless juvenile is shown to be among the rare irreparably corrupt few)