Vaughan v. Romander
360 P.3d 761
| Utah Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Parents (Father: David Vaughan; Mother: Emily Romander) disputed custody of their young child; Father petitioned for custody, support, and related relief.
- Temporary orders initially gave Mother primary physical custody; a custody evaluator (Evaluator) conducted an evaluation from 2012–2018 and provided a final updated report 14 days before trial.
- The Evaluator’s final report recommended awarding primary physical custody to Father and scheduling Mother’s parent-time as alternating weekends plus an alternating weekday overnight to minimize gaps.
- On the morning of trial Mother moved to continue, arguing she lacked time to respond to the Evaluator’s report; the trial court denied the continuance because the report was submitted within the parties’ stipulated 14-day window.
- After trial the court awarded Father primary physical custody, gave Mother more than the statutory minimum parent-time (alternating weekends plus a Tuesday overnight), and limited the right of first refusal to overnight or absences over 24 hours.
- Mother appealed the denial of the continuance, the custody award, the parent-time schedule, and the limited right of first refusal; the appellate court affirmed except for a dissent on remand necessity for parent-time findings.
Issues and Key Cases Cited
| Issue | Romander's Argument | Vaughan's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Motion to continue when evaluator’s final report was provided 14 days before trial | Trial court abused discretion by denying continuance because 14 days was insufficient to respond | Parties stipulated to 14‑day timing; evaluator timely delivered report per stipulation; denial not abuse | Affirmed — no abuse of discretion; Mother bound by stipulation |
| Award of primary physical custody to Father | Trial court’s factual findings (mother’s past engagement, financial stability, home conditions, interference with father’s time) lack evidentiary support / clearly erroneous | Findings are supported by evaluator’s testimony and other evidence; appellant failed to show clear error | Affirmed — findings not clearly erroneous; custody award not an abuse of discretion |
| Parent‑time schedule (weekday overnight choice) | Trial court erred by rejecting evaluator’s alternating‑weekday recommendation without explaining reasons; potential harm from up to seven‑day separations | Trial court reasonably chose a fixed weeknight for predictability; deviation is minor and within discretion | Majority: Affirmed (no remand); Dissent: Remand for articulated findings explaining departure from evaluator |
| Right of first refusal limited to overnight/ >24‑hour absences | Limitation effectively eliminates mother’s ability to provide care; statute presumes parental care preferable | Statute only encourages parental care; court may limit or decline ROFR; evaluator found travel/work made day‑to‑day ROFR impractical | Affirmed — limitation reasonable and supported by evaluator’s testimony; within court’s discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Clarke v. Clarke, 292 P.3d 76 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (standards for reviewing continuance denials)
- Cagatay v. Erturk, 302 P.3d 137 (Utah Ct. App. 2013) (custody award reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Kimball v. Kimball, 217 P.3d 733 (Utah Ct. App. 2009) (standard for clear‑error review of factual findings)
- Tobler v. Tobler, 337 P.3d 296 (Utah Ct. App. 2014) (trial court discretion in parent‑time decisions)
- Marchand v. Marchand, 147 P.3d 538 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (broad discretion in custody matters; reversal only for flagrant injustice)
- R.B. v. L.B., 339 P.3d 137 (Utah Ct. App. 2014) (trial court should articulate reasons when rejecting evaluator recommendations)
- Tuckey v. Tuckey, 649 P.2d 88 (Utah 1982) (remand required where court fails to state reason for rejecting social worker’s custody report)
- Wight v. Wight, 268 P.3d 861 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) (statute encouraging parental care does not create a mandatory right to provide day care)
- Redd v. Hill, 304 P.3d 861 (Utah 2013) (standards and caution for awarding attorney fees on appeal for frivolous appeals)
