Vassallo ex rel. Brown v. Majeski
2014 Minn. LEXIS 60
| Minn. | 2014Background
- On Dec. 25, 2009, Hennepin County Deputy Jason Majeski, driving a K-9 unit to an alarm with lights and (initially) siren, entered an intersection and collided with Jolene Vassallo, who suffered severe injuries. Road conditions were poor. Majeski testified he turned off the siren shortly before the intersection to avoid alerting suspects; lights remained on.
- Vassallo sued Majeski and Hennepin County for negligence; defendants moved for summary judgment based on official immunity and vicarious official immunity.
- Vassallo argued Majeski violated Minn. Stat. §169.03, subd. 2 (duty to slow and to sound siren/display red light) and HCSO Policy 6-402 ("use of both red lights and siren is required" and drive with "due regard").
- District court granted summary judgment for Majeski and county, finding duties were discretionary (or not violated) and no willful/malicious conduct; court of appeals reversed and remanded for factual findings on whether statutory/policy duties were ministerial and violated.
- Minnesota Supreme Court granted review and held as a matter of law that: the statutory duties to "slow as necessary" and "proceed cautiously" are discretionary; the statute’s siren/red-light requirement is ministerial but satisfied; HCSO Policy 6-402 does not, on its face, create a continuous-use ministerial duty and was not violated; Majeski’s conduct was not willful or malicious. Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for entry of judgment for defendants.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Vassallo) | Defendant's Argument (Majeski / Hennepin County) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Minn. Stat. §169.03, subd. 2 creates a ministerial duty that Majeski violated | §169.03 requires drivers to "slow down as necessary," "proceed cautiously," and sound siren/display lights before proceeding; Vassallo says Majeski failed to slow and turned off siren, so immunity lost | Statute contains discretionary elements ("as necessary," "proceed cautiously") except the separate absolute duty to sound siren/display red light, which Majeski satisfied | The court: slowing/proceeding cautiously are discretionary; the siren/red-light requirement is ministerial but was met (lights on) — no ministerial violation under the statute |
| Whether HCSO Policy 6-402 creates a ministerial duty to use both red lights and siren continuously during an emergency response | Policy’s phrase "use of both red lights and siren is required when responding to an emergency" mandates continuous use; Majeski’s turning off siren violated policy and defeats immunity | Policy lacks explicit temporal language (e.g., "in a continuous manner"); read with the requirement to "drive with due regard for safety," it leaves room for officer judgment; Majeski’s actions conformed to training and policy in practice | The court: HCSO Policy 6-402 does not, as written, create a continuous-use ministerial duty; no ministerial violation as a matter of law; (dissent would treat it as ministerial and remand) |
| Whether Majeski’s conduct was "willful or malicious" so as to strip immunity | Even if discretionary, conduct was so reckless or intentional that it should lose immunity | Majeski did not act willfully or maliciously — he failed to see Vassallo until the last moment and attempted to avoid collision | The court: no willful or malicious conduct as a matter of law; immunity stands |
| Whether Hennepin County is vicariously liable if Majeski is immune | County liable under respondeat superior if officer not immune | County immune if officer entitled to official immunity | The court: county entitled to vicarious official immunity because Majeski is immune |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. 2004) (official-immunity framework; ministerial vs. discretionary duties)
- Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. 1988) (distinguishing official and statutory immunity rationales)
- Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475 (Minn. 2006) (agency policy can convert discretionary acts into ministerial duties)
- Thompson v. City of Minneapolis, 707 N.W.2d 669 (Minn. 2006) (policy requiring continuous use of lights and siren held ministerial)
- Travis v. Collett, 218 Minn. 592 (Minn. 1944) (statutory duty to slow and proceed cautiously is conditioned on officer judgment)
- Kari v. City of Maplewood, 582 N.W.2d 921 (Minn. 1998) (definition of malice for immunity exception)