Vasquez v. Davis, 882 F.3d 1270

Background

Jimmy Vasquez, a Colorado inmate diagnosed with chronic hepatitis C (HCV) in 2004, alleges CDOC medical providers delayed HCV treatment, causing permanent, life‑threatening liver damage.
CDOC policy required inmates to complete six months of drug & alcohol (D&A) classes and request treatment to qualify for costly antiviral HCV therapy; Vasquez had intermittent access to and difficulties enrolling in those classes.
From 2006–2012 various physician’s assistants (Webster, Chamjock, Melloh) monitored Vasquez’s worsening liver (elevated enzymes/ammonia); Webster diagnosed cirrhosis in 2008 but did not refer him to D&A classes due to mistaken beliefs about eligibility.
In Feb. 2012 Dr. Fauvel saw Vasquez, discussed HCV treatment, referred him to enroll in D&A classes, ordered a liver biopsy in Aug. 2012 (requiring third‑party approval), and repeatedly corresponded with CDOC administrators about treatment.
Vasquez suffered a major bleeding episode in May 2013 and was told outside doctors he then did not qualify for existing antiviral treatments; he filed this § 1983 suit in May 2014 alleging Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference.
The district court granted summary judgment for all named defendants and entered a sua sponte permanent injunction requiring triennial liver‑function testing; the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment and vacated the injunction.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness of claims against Davis, Webster, Chamjock, Melloh	Vasquez contends ongoing delay in treatment continued into limitations period; claims are timely under continuing‑violation theory	Defendants argue claims accrued earlier (by Feb. 2012) and are barred by the two‑year Colorado limitations period	Claims against Davis, Webster, Chamjock, Melloh accrued by Feb. 2012 and are time‑barred; continuing‑violation doctrine does not save them
Applicability of continuing‑violation doctrine to § 1983 delay claims	Doctrine applies because harm from the delay persisted until treatment in 2016	Even if doctrine applies, it requires wrongful acts within the limitations period by each defendant; these defendants had no relevant acts then	Court assumed doctrine need not be resolved; in any event it would not save claims because none of these defendants acted within the limitations period
Deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Fauvel	Vasquez argues Fauvel’s delays and failures to secure timely biopsy/treatment demonstrate subjective deliberate indifference	Fauvel contends he timely evaluated Vasquez, referred him for D&A and biopsy, sought committee approval, and worked within CDOC and payor constraints; his actions reflect medical judgment not indifference	Summary judgment for Fauvel affirmed: record shows Fauvel pursued workup and administrative approvals; no evidence of subjective deliberate indifference
Injunction requiring CDOC to test Vasquez’s liver every 3 months	Vasquez did not challenge vacatur	State defendants argued injunction improperly entered against individuals and absent a finding of constitutional violation	Permanent injunction vacated and remanded to district court to dismiss; injunction could only have applied to official‑capacity defendant and Vasquez does not oppose vacatur

Key Cases Cited

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard)
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (subjective knowledge and disregard requirement for deliberate indifference)
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (accrual of § 1983 claims; federal law governs accrual)
Al‑Turki v. Robinson, 762 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2014) (elements for Eighth Amendment medical‑care claims)
Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2006) (medical judgment vs. deliberate indifference)
Sylvia v. Glanz, 875 F.3d 1307 (10th Cir. 2017) (standard of review for summary judgment)
Colby v. Herrick, 849 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2017) (continuing‑violation doctrine discussion in § 1983 context)