Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem, 25-4312

Plaintiffs (five individuals and three associations) challenged federal immigration enforcement practices in Los Angeles, arguing that "Operation At Large" involved detentive stops based solely on race/ethnicity, language, location, and type of work, without reasonable suspicion.
Plaintiffs alleged these practices violated the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures.
District court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining such stops, finding Plaintiffs likely to succeed on the merits and that a pattern of officially-approved, suspicionless stops existed.
Defendants (senior federal immigration officials) appealed and sought an emergency stay of the TRO, primarily challenging Plaintiffs’ standing, the scope/terms of the TRO, and its consistency with the Fourth Amendment.
The Ninth Circuit considered whether to stay the TRO during appeal, analyzing standing, likelihood of future harm, and the appropriateness/clarity of the injunction.
The operative TRO barred stops based solely on the four identified factors and applied district-wide to provide complete relief to the named and association plaintiffs.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing for Injunctive Relief	Ongoing pattern of stops makes future harm likely for all plaintiffs	Future injury not sufficiently likely for individuals or associations	Plaintiffs (individuals and associations) have standing; pattern of sanctioned behavior makes recurrence likely
Vagueness of TRO	TRO specifically enjoins stops based on four enumerated factors	TRO, especially “except as permitted by law” clause, is impermissibly vague	Only “except as permitted by law” is vague; rest of TRO is sufficiently clear
Consistency with Fourth Amendment	Stops on four factors alone fail “reasonable suspicion” requirement	TRO unlawfully bars reliance on statutorily/constitutionally relevant factors	TRO valid: prohibits stops based solely on the four factors, which cannot establish reasonable suspicion in this context
Scope of District-wide Relief	Necessary for complete relief, as profiling is based on group, not individuals	District-wide TRO exceeds proper boundaries, confers benefits on non-parties	District-wide injunction appropriate to protect all plaintiffs and association members

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (injury-in-fact and standing requirements)
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (injunction standing requirement for likely future injury)
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (reasonable suspicion in immigration stops)
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (totality of circumstances standard for reasonable suspicion)
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (reasonable suspicion requires more than isolated factors)
United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122 (consideration of race/ethnicity under Fourth Amendment)
United States v. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928 (limitations of profiling in reasonable suspicion)
Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719 (injunction scope and limits)
Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486 (statewide relief necessary where practical considerations preclude plaintiff-only relief)