Varques Lamarr Johnson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 49A04-1702-CR-288

On July 18, 2016, Varques Johnson and Tayllor Nevarez argued in a restaurant parking lot while their seven-month-old daughter was present; Johnson allegedly struck Nevarez in the face, broke her glasses, and left the child in the car.
Police and an eyewitness observed redness/bruising on Nevarez’s face and her broken glasses near the car.
The State charged Johnson with Level 6 felony domestic battery (in the presence of a child), Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, and Class A misdemeanor battery causing bodily injury.
Bench trial: Nevarez, an eyewitness, and an officer testified for the State; Johnson denied striking Nevarez. The trial court found Nevarez credible and convicted Johnson on Counts 1 and 2, acquitted on Count 3.
At sentencing the court imposed a 365-day sentence (with most suspended) and stated Counts 1 and 2 would merge for sentencing. The court’s verbal findings and the CCS indicated guilty findings on both counts before merger.
Johnson appealed, contesting sufficiency of the evidence and arguing a double jeopardy violation because the court entered judgment on both counts before merging them.

Issue	State's Argument	Johnson's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence to convict for domestic battery and felony domestic battery (presence of child)	Nevarez’s testimony, corroborated by eyewitness and officer observations, is sufficient to support convictions	Victim’s testimony was self-contradicting, vacillating, and unreliable; conviction should be reversed	Affirmed: credibility and weight are for the factfinder; uncorroborated victim testimony can sustain conviction and here it was corroborated and found credible
Whether entering judgment on both counts then merging violated double jeopardy	State argued only Count 1 was sentenced and merger resolved sentencing overlap	Trial court entered guilt findings and judgments on both counts before merging; this entry of multiple judgments for the same act violates double jeopardy and requires vacatur	Remanded: trial court entered judgment on Count 2 before merger; double jeopardy violation—vacate Count 2 conviction and instruct trial court to do so

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144 (2007) (standard for sufficiency review and appellate deference to factfinder credibility determinations)
Holeton v. State, 853 N.E.2d 539 (2006) (a victim’s uncorroborated testimony can be sufficient to sustain a conviction)
Gaddis v. State, 251 N.E.2d 658 (1969) (reversal where victim’s identification was vacillating and uncertain)
West v. State, 22 N.E.3d 872 (2014) (entering judgments on multiple counts then merging is insufficient to cure double jeopardy; remand to vacate the redundant conviction)
Bass v. State, 75 N.E.3d 1100 (2017) (similar holding that merger after entering multiple convictions does not remedy double jeopardy)
Green v. State, 856 N.E.2d 703 (2006) (constitutional rule that entering judgment twice for the same offense violates defendant’s rights)