Varley v. First Student, Inc.
119 A.3d 643
Conn. App. Ct.2015Background
- Varley was hired and paid by First Student as a school bus driver; First Student set her hours, routes and provided supervision.
- Regional School District 4 (the defendant) had a contract with First Student allowing the superintendent to request discontinuation of drivers "considered unsatisfactory."
- After multiple complaints (including incidents involving a special-education student, reports to administration, handing out candy, and alleged screaming at students), school officials asked First Student to remove Varley from certain routes; Varley was reassigned but not fired by First Student.
- Varley publicly complained at school district committee meetings about being removed from routes; the district’s superintendent then requested Varley be removed from all district routes and the district’s counsel sent a cease-and-desist letter telling her to direct employment inquiries to First Student.
- Varley later resigned from First Student and sued the district alleging (1) wrongful discipline/discharge under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q and (2) tortious interference with her employment contract with First Student. The trial court granted summary judgment for the district; Varley appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Regional School District 4 was Varley’s "employer" under § 31-51q | Varley argued the district’s exercise of contractual control over her routes made it an employer for § 31-51q purposes | District argued Varley was employed and paid by First Student, not the district, and "employer" has its ordinary meaning | Court held district was not Varley’s employer under § 31-51q; summary judgment for district on this count |
| Whether the district tortiously interfered with Varley’s employment with First Student | Varley argued the district intentionally and wrongfully caused adverse employment consequences by requesting her removal and by communications with First Student | District argued its communications were made pursuant to a contractual right, based on legitimate safety/parental complaints, and thus justified | Court held the district’s actions were justified under the contract and societal safety concerns; no evidence of improper motive or means, so summary judgment for district on tortious interference claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Blake v. Levy, 191 Conn. 257 (Conn. 1983) (tortious interference requires proof of improper motive or improper means by plaintiff)
- Daley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 249 Conn. 766 (Conn. 1999) (plaintiff bears burden to plead and prove lack of justification for interference)
- Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205 (Conn. 2000) (elements of tortious interference with contractual relations)
- Young v. Bridgeport, 135 Conn. App. 699 (Conn. App. 2012) (standing under § 31-51q requires an employer-employee relationship)
- Stone-Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672 (Conn. 2006) (use of dictionary/ordinary meaning in statutory construction)
- State v. Spears, 234 Conn. 78 (Conn. 1995) (court should avoid statutory constructions that yield absurd results)