36 F. Supp. 3d 377
S.D.N.Y.2014Background
- Plaintiffs Geoffrey Varga and Mark Longbottom, as Joint Official Liquidators for two Bear Stearns offshore funds, brought a New York common-law fraud claim alleging the three major credit-rating agencies misrepresented ratings and independence, inducing the funds to buy high-grade RMBS/CDOs that collapsed.
- Defendants are S&P (McGraw Hill), Moody’s, and Fitch, each designated an NRSRO under CRARA and subject to SEC rules requiring codes of conduct addressing objectivity and conflicts.
- Plaintiffs allege defendants manipulated models and ratings under the issuer-pays model to capture market share, causing Plaintiffs’ funds’ losses; they seek compensatory and punitive damages under New York law.
- Defendants removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, asserting federal-question jurisdiction because resolution would require interpreting federal law (CRARA and SEC rules).
- The Court applied the Grable/Gunn four-part test for federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims and concluded the complaint does not necessarily raise a substantial federal issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the state-law fraud claim "necessarily raises" a federal issue under Grable | Varga: claim is classic New York common-law fraud; no federal-law construction required to determine falsity, reliance, or injury | Rating Agencies: resolution requires interpreting CRARA/SEC rules because those laws authorize the issuer-pays model and mandate codes addressing independence | Held: No. The fraud claim does not necessarily raise a federal issue; federal law is incidental or a possible defense, not essential to the claim |
| Whether removal is proper because claim depends on compliance with federally required documents (e.g., codes of conduct) | Varga: false statements in federally mandated or voluntary documents can be adjudicated under state fraud law without construing federal law | Rating Agencies: alleged misrepresentations in SEC-mandated documents make federal-law interpretation required | Held: No. Truth/falsity of statements in federally required documents is evaluated under state law; compliance with CRARA is a defense, not a basis for federal jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (U.S. 2013) (summarizes Grable four-part test for federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims)
- Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005) (federal issue must be necessarily raised, actually disputed, substantial, and capable of resolution without disrupting federal-state balance)
- Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (federal-question inquiry uses the well-pleaded complaint rule)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (a federal defense does not confer federal-question jurisdiction)
- Marcus v. AT & T Corp., 138 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1998) (artful-pleading doctrine limits avoiding federal jurisdiction by state-law framing)
- Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2013) (removal statute construed narrowly; doubts resolved against removability)
- Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2006) (burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on removing party)
- Premium Mortgage Corp. v. Equifax, Inc., 583 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2009) (elements of common-law fraud under New York law)
- D’Alessio v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 258 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2001) (state-law claims that rest on violations of federal securities laws can present substantial federal issues)
- In re Facebook, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 2d 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying remand where state-law negligence claim required exclusively federal-law construction of exchange duties)
