Vanterpool v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 2015 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 23

Background

After Hurricane Marilyn (1995), Vanterpool contracted with the Government of the Virgin Islands to repair two schools; both contracts were stamped "Public Exigency."
Government officials orally requested Vanterpool to perform additional emergency repairs to other schools and facilities; Vanterpool invoiced for substantial additional sums.
The Government paid only the amounts in the written contracts and later entered one limited retroactive written contract; Vanterpool sued in 2004 for the unpaid sums and interest.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court treated the Government’s statement of facts as undisputed under District Court Local Rule 56.1 and granted the Government summary judgment, rejecting quantum meruit recovery.
Procedural irregularities: a July 12, 2013 opinion was signed by Judge Dunston for Judge Mackay while the case was assigned to Judge Mackay; recusal and reassignment followed; Vanterpool appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Authority of Judge Dunston to enter July 12 order	Dunterpool (Vanterpool) argued the July 12 opinion was void because it was entered by a judge not assigned to the case	Government implied rulings by the court were valid; procedural posture accepted by Superior Court	Judge Dunston exceeded authority in issuing a dispositive order while the case was assigned to Judge Mackay, but the Supreme Court declined to vacate for judicial economy because the case was later assigned to Dunston
Application of District Court Local Rule 56.1 in Superior Court	Vanterpool argued Superior Court should not rigidly apply District Court Rule 56.1 to deem facts admitted when he failed to file a separate LR56.1 statement	Government argued Vanterpool failed to follow 56.1 and bore the risk	Court held the Superior Court erred: it may not mechanically apply District Court Rule 56.1 to treat the Government’s facts as undisputed and must independently review the record before granting summary judgment
Effect of "Public Exigency" on statutory writing/approval requirements (31 V.I.C. §§236,239,234)	Vanterpool asserted exigency could waive written-form requirements so oral modifications might be enforceable	Government argued section 239 only waives competitive bidding but not the writing requirement; contracts must be stamped and a written requisition attached	Court held section 239(a)(2) waives bidding but section 239(b) contemplates written requisitions stamped "PUBLIC EXIGENCY," so exigency does not eliminate the requirement of a written procurement document
Availability of quantum meruit against the Government (31 V.I.C. §249(a))	Vanterpool argued he may recover in quantum meruit for services the Government accepted despite statutory defects in formation	Government relied on Third Circuit/District Court precedent reading §249(a) to bar quantum meruit against the Government where procurement statutes were violated	Court held §249(a) does not categorically bar quantum meruit; sovereign’s "sue and be sued" waiver and federal precedent allow quantum meruit in equity where government was enriched and contractor was innocent

Key Cases Cited

Smith v. Dep’t of Educ., 942 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1991) (held procurement statute barred recovery where contract violated chapter; relied on by lower courts)
United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (permitted quantum meruit recovery against the government for benefits accepted despite contract invalidity)
Prestex, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 367 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (equitable recovery ordered where government accepted services under an unenforceable contract)
Mar v. Kleppe, 520 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1975) (interpreting "sue and be sued" clause as authorizing suits sounding in contract, including equitable relief)
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (discussing the distinction between jurisdictional rules and non-jurisdictional procedural limitations)