2026-MO-014
S.C.Jul 1, 2026Background
- The Vannattas challenged Sullivan's Island Zoning Ordinance section 21-75(B)(2), which bars docks in part of the RC-2 district and limits dock length with an exception for certain wide creeks. 1
- Their proposed dock would have been 486 feet long to reach a 62-foot-wide creek, and the Board of Zoning Appeals denied the dock permit. 2
- The Vannattas argued the ordinance was illegal reverse spot zoning, violated substantive due process, and denied equal protection. 3
- They alternatively sought a variance from the ordinance's restrictions after buying the property in 2014, years after the ordinance's 2004 enactment. 4
- The Town's comprehensive plan and zoning findings emphasized preserving the RC areas in a natural state for ecology, safety, recreation, and aesthetics. 5
- The circuit court affirmed the BZA, and the supreme court likewise affirmed. 6
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reverse spot zoning 7 | Ordinance singled out their property for dock prohibition. | Restriction applied broadly and was an affirmative legislative act. | No reverse spot zoning; ordinance valid. 8 |
| Substantive due process 9 | Dock restrictions were arbitrary and unreasonable. | Restrictions reasonably furthered legitimate governmental interests. | No substantive due process violation. 10 |
| Equal protection 11 | Ordinance irrationally treated their property differently. | Rational basis existed for the classification. | No equal protection violation. 12 |
| Variance denial 13 | BZA wrongly denied hardship variance. | No unnecessary hardship or entitlement to variance. | Variance properly denied. 14 |
Key Cases Cited
- Ani Creation, Inc. v. City of Myrtle Beach Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 440 S.C. 266, 890 S.E.2d 748 (S.C. 2023) (municipal ordinances are presumed constitutional; reverse spot zoning and rational-basis principles 15)
- McMaster v. Columbia Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 395 S.C. 499, 719 S.E.2d 660 (S.C. 2011) (ordinance invalidity must be shown clearly and legislation must bear a reasonable relation to legitimate interests 16)
- First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 444 S.E.2d 513 (S.C. 1994) (failure to cite authority may constitute abandonment on appeal 17)
- Knowles v. City of Aiken, 305 S.C. 219, 407 S.E.2d 639 (S.C. 1991) (spot-zoning review considers comprehensive plan and common welfare 18)
- Dunes W. Golf Club, LLC v. Town of Mount Pleasant, 401 S.C. 280, 737 S.E.2d 601 (S.C. 2013) (substantive due process requires a reasonable relationship to legitimate governmental interests 19)
- Harbit v. City of Charleston, 382 S.C. 383, 675 S.E.2d 776 (Ct. App. 2009) (due process is not denied merely because the owner cannot make the most beneficial use 20)
- Bibco Corp. v. City of Sumter, 332 S.C. 45, 504 S.E.2d 112 (S.C. 1998) (rational-basis equal-protection review and municipal aesthetics as a legitimate interest 21)
- Rest. Row Assocs. v. Horry County, 335 S.C. 209, 516 S.E.2d 442 (S.C. 1999) (variance standards and unnecessary-hardship factors 22)
- Rushing v. City of Greenville, 265 S.C. 285, 217 S.E.2d 797 (S.C. 1975) (courts defer where the municipality's action is fairly debatable 23)
- Arkay, LLC v. City of Charleston, 418 S.C. 86, 791 S.E.2d 305 (Ct. App. 2016) (appellate courts defer to local zoning interpretation decisions 24)
