Vanessa Renee Caison v. Culpeper County Department of Social Services, 0674214

D.G., born to Vanessa Caison, was removed from mother’s care in April 2019 after reports of hazardous home conditions (flooding, mold, snakes), educational neglect, and an incident of aggressive behavior toward a boarder.
The Department placed D.G. in foster care and provided extensive services to mother: substance-abuse evaluation and counseling, random drug screens, intensive therapeutic parenting, parental capacity evaluation, supervised visitation, mental-health case management, and financial/housing assistance.
A parental capacity evaluation (Feb. 2020) diagnosed mother with substance-use disorders, major depression, personality traits, and found inconsistent parenting skills; mother admitted long-term substance use.
Mother initially engaged but later was incarcerated and had pending criminal charges, which limited her participation in services; the Department concluded she failed to utilize offered services.
In foster care for over two years, D.G. made substantial educational and emotional gains; the circuit court terminated mother’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) and (E)(i); the Court of Appeals affirmed under § 16.1-283(E)(i).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Caison)	Defendant's Argument (Department)	Held
Were offered services reasonable and appropriate?	Department failed to provide contact/services post-incarceration and caused the lack of relationship.	Department provided numerous, clearly communicated services and supports; mother failed to utilize them and was later incarcerated.	Court found mother failed to use services; however, it affirmed termination on alternative statutory ground (§16.1-283(E)(i)) and did not need to rely solely on reasonableness under (C)(2).
Was mother unwilling or unable to remedy conditions that led to foster placement?	Mother claimed progress and cited COVID, transportation, work schedule, and incarceration as barriers to completing services.	Mother had longstanding substance problems, criminal issues, and did not complete required services; she was not in a position to parent.	Court found clear evidence mother did not remedy the conditions and was not able to resume care.
Was termination in the child’s best interests?	Termination was not in D.G.’s best interests; any lack of relationship resulted from Department actions.	D.G. thrived in foster care, made substantial progress, was removed from hazardous conditions, and mother’s incarceration and prior termination of parental rights to a sibling weigh against reunification.	Court held termination was in D.G.’s best interests and affirmed termination under §16.1-283(E)(i).

Yafi v. Stafford Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 69 Va. App. 539 (2018) (standard for reviewing termination—view evidence in favor of prevailing party)
Thach v. Arlington Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 63 Va. App. 157 (2014) (deference to trial court findings on termination appeals)
Fauquier Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Ridgeway, 59 Va. App. 185 (2011) (weight given to ore tenus findings)
Castillo v. Loudoun Cnty. Dep’t of Fam. Servs., 68 Va. App. 547 (2018) (trial court presumed to weigh evidence and consider best interests)
Tackett v. Arlington Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 62 Va. App. 296 (2013) (child’s best interests paramount; prolonged waiting for parental improvement disfavored)
Kaywood v. Halifax Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535 (1990) (child should not be forced to wait indefinitely for parent to become fit)
Levick v. MacDougall, 294 Va. 283 (2017) (principles governing limited unsealing of sealed records)