Vanessa Black v. Toyota Boshoku Illinois, LLC
3:17-cv-00309
S.D. Ill.Sep 6, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Vanessa Black sued Toyota Boshoku Illinois, LLC under Section 4(h) of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act; diversity jurisdiction asserted.
- A Clerk’s Entry of Default was entered against Toyota on August 8, 2017 after Toyota failed to respond timely.
- Toyota moved to set aside the default and for leave to file an answer, arguing it was not properly served and only learned of the case after the default entry.
- Toyota alleged service was attempted on a night-shift employee (Rudy Shaffer) who was not an officer or agent, so service under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) or 4(h) was ineffective.
- Toyota’s counsel contacted plaintiff’s counsel promptly after learning of the default and filed the motion to set aside within seven days of the Clerk’s Entry of Default.
- Toyota asserted a meritorious defense: Black was terminated for job abandonment, not in retaliation for her workers’ compensation claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Clerk’s Entry of Default should be set aside under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) | Default should stand (implied by failure to oppose entry) | Service was improper; good cause, prompt action, and a meritorious defense justify vacatur | Default vacated; leave granted to file answer within 7 days |
Key Cases Cited
- Sun v. Board of Trustees of University of IL, 473 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2007) (vacatur of default judged by good-cause standard and preference for deciding cases on the merits)
- Sims v. EGA Prods., 475 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2007) (Rule 55(c) requires good cause for judicial action, not necessarily for the defendant’s error)
- Jones v. Phipps, 39 F.3d 158 (7th Cir. 1994) (contrast between standards for vacating defaults under Rule 55(c) and vacating default judgments under Rule 60(b))
- Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2009) (policy favoring trial on the merits over default judgments)
- C.K.S. Eng’rs, Inc. v. White Mountain Gypsum Co., 726 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1984) (default judgments should be used only in extreme situations)