Vandyke, Roger Dale
538 S.W.3d 561
Tex. Crim. App.2017Background
- Appellant Roger Dale VanDyke was civilly committed as a sexually violent predator and required to participate in sex-offender treatment; he was discharged from the program and later indicted and convicted under former Health & Safety Code § 841.085 for failing to comply with treatment.
- VanDyke pleaded guilty and received a 25-year prison sentence; his direct appeal was pending when the Legislature enacted S.B. 746 in 2015.
- S.B. 746 reorganized the civil-commitment program (creating a tiered system and moving authority to the Texas Civil Commitment Office) and removed failure-to-participate-in-treatment from the list of criminal offenses under § 841.085.
- S.B. 746 included a savings clause applying the decriminalization to offenses committed before, on, or after its effective date but preserving any "final conviction" existing on that date; the bill took immediate effect while VanDyke’s conviction was not yet final.
- VanDyke argued the amendments decriminalized his conduct and required reversal; the State agreed the savings clause applied to pending appeals but contended the clause violated the Separation of Powers by usurping the Governor’s clemency power.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals held the amendments decriminalized VanDyke’s conduct, that the savings clause applied to his pending conviction, and that the Legislature did not usurp or unduly interfere with the Governor’s clemency power—vacating VanDyke’s conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (VanDyke) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether S.B. 746 decriminalized VanDyke’s conduct and applies to convictions pending on appeal | The amendments remove the criminal offense, and the savings clause covers non-final convictions pending on appeal, so his conviction must be reversed | Agreed the savings clause reaches pending appeals but argued the savings clause is unconstitutional because it usurps the Governor’s clemency power | S.B. 746 decriminalized the conduct; savings clause applies to non-final convictions on appeal; conviction vacated |
| Whether the Legislature’s savings clause usurps the Governor’s clemency power (Article II, §1 / Art. IV, §11) | Savings clause is a valid legislative repeal/decriminalization, not a pardon; Legislature may repeal crimes and apply repeal to pending cases | Savings clause functionally granted relief that only the Governor could grant via clemency, thus violating separation of powers | Legislature did not usurp clemency: repeal/decriminalization invalidates convictions; a pardon affects punishment/legal disabilities, not the underlying conviction |
| Whether the savings clause unduly interferes with the Executive’s ability to grant clemency | Repeal does not prevent Governor from granting clemency in valid cases; executive power remains intact for final convictions | Savings clause curtails executive discretion to relieve individuals after conviction | No undue interference: Governor can still grant clemency for final convictions; statute does not prevent effective exercise of clemency |
| Remedy for convictions affected by the repeal | Vacatur and dismissal because the underlying conduct is no longer a crime | Sought to preserve conviction despite repeal on separation-of-powers grounds | Vacatur of conviction and dismissal because decriminalization removes the basis for prosecution |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Giles, 502 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (legislative schemes allowing resentencing after conviction may violate separation of powers)
- Jones v. State, 147 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 1941) (pardon removes penalties but does not obliterate conviction; limits of clemency power)
- Yeaton v. United States, 9 U.S. 281 (U.S. 1809) (repeal of a penal law extinguishes future enforcement absent saving provision)
- Hall v. State, 106 S.W. 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1907) (legislative repeal of criminal statute while appeal pending requires reversal)
- Williams v. State, 476 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (application of legislative repeal and savings provisions)
- Mendoza v. State, 460 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (legislative repeal can invalidate pending convictions)
- Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (judicial final judgment entry is a core judicial power; separation of powers analysis)