Vanderkallen v. Glen Ivy Recreational etc. CA4/2
E072622
Cal. Ct. App.Sep 30, 2020Background
- Plaintiffs Sheri Vanderkallen, Daniel Vanderkallen, and Jonnie Little are members/shareholders of Glen Ivy RV Park and sued the Glen Ivy Recreational Vehicle Park Owners Association (the Association) after the Board voted to suspend and expel them following a May 3, 2018 altercation.
- Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint asserted three causes of action: breach of the Association’s governing documents and rules, unfair competition (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200), and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
- The Association held a July 6, 2018 board meeting (and a July 30 appeal hearing) that resulted in a vote to expel plaintiffs; the Association later served a Notice to Vacate and filed an unlawful detainer.
- Plaintiffs alleged the CC&Rs/bylaws/rules do not authorize expulsion and that the Association failed to follow stepped disciplinary procedures and applied rules discriminatorily.
- The Association moved to strike under the anti‑SLAPP statute (§ 425.16), arguing plaintiffs’ claims arose from protected petitioning/speech (board meetings, notices). The trial court denied the motion for lack of proof the challenged actions occurred in a public forum.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding plaintiffs’ claims challenge the Association’s ultimate decision to expel (not protected speech or petitions), and the anti‑SLAPP motion therefore failed the first prong.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs’ claims arise from protected petitioning or free speech under § 425.16 | Vanderkallen: claims attack the Association’s decision to expel and procedural noncompliance, not protected statements | Association: claims stem from board votes/hearings, notices, and thus are protected petitioning/public‑forum activity | Court: claims attack the Association’s ultimate decision to expel (not statements); anti‑SLAPP protection does not apply; first prong unmet |
| Whether the Board meetings/notices were in a “place open to the public” (§ 425.16(e)(3)) | Plaintiffs: hearings lacked due process and were not public forums | Association: board meetings and associated notices are public forums where protected activity occurred | Trial court found insufficient proof the meetings were public; appellate agreed decision to expel is not shielded by § 425.16(e)(3) |
| Whether plaintiffs demonstrated a probability of prevailing (second prong) | Plaintiffs: alleged governing‑document violations and discriminatory enforcement | Association: argued plaintiffs lacked probability of success | Court: did not reach second‑prong analysis because defendant failed first prong |
| Whether the court should take judicial notice of civil harassment restraining orders | (Plaintiffs) opposed/not addressed in detail | Association: asked for judicial notice, claiming orders are court records (allegedly confidential) | Court denied judicial notice: Association failed to supply copies or evidence the orders were sealed/confidential |
Key Cases Cited
- Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (describes the two‑step anti‑SLAPP framework)
- Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal.4th 299 (standard of review and anti‑SLAPP principles)
- Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University, 2 Cal.5th 1057 (distinguishes protected speech from governmental decisions; ultimate decisions are not protected)
- San Ramon Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Assoc., 125 Cal.App.4th 343 (acts of governance mandated by law are not free speech/petitioning)
- Third Laguna Hills Mutual v. Joslin, 49 Cal.App.5th 366 (similar holding that challenge to association’s decision is not protected activity)
- Ruiz v. Harbor View Community Association, 134 Cal.App.4th 1456 (letters/writings may be protected under § 425.16(e)(4); distinguishable where plaintiff sues the ultimate decision)
- Lee v. Silveira, 6 Cal.App.5th 527 (individual board members’ votes/statements can implicate free speech; distinguishable where claim is against the association itself)
- Swanson v. County of Riverside, 36 Cal.App.5th 361 (discusses limits of anti‑SLAPP protection for government/official decisions)
- Trapp v. Naiman, 218 Cal.App.4th 113 (plaintiff’s subjective intent irrelevant to whether anti‑SLAPP applies)