Vance Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13942
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- December 1994: unarmed bar shooting in Erie, PA killed Darrell Cooley; shooter fled with Curtis Mathis. Haskell was later charged as the shooter.
- Prosecution’s identity evidence: circumstantial links placing Haskell in Erie, witnesses who saw a shooter with a green puffy coat and a large gun, and four eyewitnesses who identified Haskell.
- Three eyewitnesses had significant credibility problems (one recanted, two had earlier denied they could identify the shooter). Antoinette Blue uniquely gave a consistent in-court identification and said she expected no benefit for testifying.
- Record shows Blue did in fact expect and receive favorable treatment on pending charges after cooperating; the prosecutor knew of this and failed to correct Blue’s false testimony and vouched for her at closing.
- Haskell’s state collateral claim was time-barred, but the Commonwealth waived procedural default; federal habeas court found the testimony false and the prosecutor knew, denied relief applying Brecht; Third Circuit reviews de novo.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Blue committed perjury and prosecutor knew/facilitated false testimony | Blue lied about expecting no benefit; prosecution knew and failed to correct | Testimony and ensuing events were coincidental or not material | Held: Blue’s statements were false; Commonwealth knew and failed to correct them (perjury established) |
| Materiality standard required to obtain habeas relief for knowing use of perjured testimony | Giglio/Napue reasonable-likelihood/materiality standard is sufficient on habeas | Brecht actual-prejudice (substantial and injurious effect) should apply on habeas | Held: Brecht does not apply to cases where the state knowingly presents/fails to correct perjured testimony; Giglio/Napue reasonable-likelihood standard governs |
| Whether false testimony was material to the verdict | Blue was a key witness; other ID witnesses were weak; prosecutor vouched for her — reasonable likelihood jury judgment was affected | Commonwealth argued error was harmless under Brecht standard applied by District Court | Held: There is a reasonable likelihood Blue’s false testimony could have affected the jury; materiality met under Giglio/Napue |
| Remedy on habeas | Relief required because constitutional error infected trial fairness | Commonwealth urged denial because Haskell failed Brecht actual-prejudice showing | Held: Grant habeas relief and remand for further proceedings; no Brecht showing required when state knowingly uses perjury |
Key Cases Cited
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (false testimony about promises of consideration requires disclosure and may require new trial)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (prosecutor must correct witness falsehoods about agreements; materiality standard)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (habeas relief generally requires actual prejudice — substantial and injurious effect)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (materiality standard for withheld evidence; merger of materiality and harmless-error in Brady context)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (Brady claims on habeas governable by materiality standard; Brecht not applied to suppression claims)
- United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (Brady categories and strict review for perjured testimony)
- Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (prosecutorial use of known perjury inconsistent with justice)
- Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing perjured-testimony materiality standard)