Van Winkle v. State
2016 Ark. 98
| Ark. | 2016Background
- David Van Winkle, a Mena dentist, was convicted by a jury of kidnapping, aggravated residential burglary, first‑degree stalking, third‑degree battery, first‑degree assault, and first‑degree terroristic threatening; total sentence 52 years including a 12‑year firearm enhancement. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed.
- At trial the victim (M.O.) testified Van Winkle forced oral sex, later surprised her at home with a pistol, zip‑tied and assaulted her, and she escaped to a neighbor; police found Van Winkle nearby with a loaded gun, a screwdriver, and zip ties; corroborating physical evidence and signs of forced entry were recovered.
- Van Winkle filed a Rule 37.1 petition claiming ineffective assistance on three grounds: (1) counsel failed to present an actual‑innocence defense based on his blindness, deafness, and back problems; (2) counsel failed to move for change of venue despite pretrial publicity; and (3) counsel failed to object to a jury instruction/verdict form on the firearm enhancement (and the instruction was structural error). He also argued the denial of a hearing was erroneous.
- The circuit court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing; the Arkansas Supreme Court reviews such denials for clear error and applies Strickland for ineffective‑assistance claims.
- The majority held (1) counsel had in fact advanced the actual‑innocence/set‑up theory and elicited testimony about Van Winkle’s impairments (so no deficient performance), (2) decision not to seek change of venue was a strategic choice and Van Winkle showed no juror bias or prejudice, (3) counsel’s failure to object to the firearm‑enhancement instruction was deficient but Van Winkle failed to prove prejudice because evidence and other instructions established the use of a firearm, and (4) the record and petition conclusively showed no entitlement to relief, so no hearing was required.
Issues
| Issue | Van Winkle's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Ineffective assistance for not presenting an actual‑innocence defense | Van Winkle: physically incapable (no glasses/hearing aids, bad back) and was framed; counsel should have called experts/witnesses | State: defense did present an actual‑innocence/set‑up theory and elicited evidence of impairments; witness choices are strategic | Held: No deficient performance — trial record shows counsel pursued that defense; omission of cumulative witnesses not ineffective. |
| 2. Ineffective assistance for failing to move for change of venue | Van Winkle: extensive prejudicial pretrial publicity required moving venue | State: counsel was aware of publicity and tactically used local character witnesses instead of moving; no evidence jurors were biased | Held: No ineffective assistance — strategic decision and Van Winkle failed to show juror bias or prejudice. |
| 3. Firearm enhancement: instruction error (structural) and ineffective assistance | Van Winkle: jury was not instructed to find firearm use beyond a reasonable doubt; sentence void; counsel ineffective for failing to object | State: counsel failed to preserve structural claim; but trial evidence/instructions established firearm use | Held: Structural‑error claim not preserved; counsel’s failure to object was deficient but no Strickland prejudice shown because testimony and other instructions made firearm use clear. |
| 4. Denial of evidentiary hearing | Van Winkle: petition alleged facts entitling him to a hearing | State: petition and record conclusively show no relief warranted | Held: No hearing required — petition and record showed Van Winkle was not entitled to relief and circuit court made required written findings. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (any fact increasing sentence beyond statutory maximum must be proved to a jury beyond reasonable doubt)
- Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (failure to instruct on sentencing fact may be subject to harmless‑error analysis rather than automatic reversal)
- Taylor v. State, 470 S.W.3d 271 (Ark. 2015) (applications of Strickland and prejudice standard in Arkansas postconviction context)
- Beverage v. State, 458 S.W.3d 243 (Ark. 2015) (standard for denying Rule 37 petition without an evidentiary hearing)