664 F.3d 56
5th Cir.2011Background
- Van Staden, a South African citizen and LPN licensed in Texas, moved to Louisiana in 2007 and applied for a Louisiana Board of Practical Nurse Examiners license.
- Louisiana law LA.REV.STAT. § 37:970(2) requires LPN applicants to be a US citizen or permanent resident.
- Van Staden applied to USCIS for permanent residence in July 2007; status not yet granted, though she can work in the US.
- She sued the Board alleging § 37:970(2) unconstitutional under equal protection, due process, travel, and related clauses.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the Board; on appeal, Van Staden challenges only the equal-protection theory.
- The court analyzes whether LPR applicants are a suspect class and whether rational-basis review applies to the statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether LPR applicants are a suspect class for Equal Protection purposes | Van Staden argues LPR applicants are akin to permanent residents and warrant strict scrutiny. | Board argues LPR applicants are non-suspect and fall outside strict scrutiny under LeClerc. | LPR applicants are not a suspect class; strict scrutiny not required. |
| Applicable standard of review for § 37:970(2) under equal protection | Van Staden contends heightened scrutiny due to alienage. | Board relies on LeClerc to apply rational-basis review to non-suspect classifications. | Rational-basis review governs; statute survives. |
| Whether LeClerc controls the outcome for LPR applicants in this licensing context | Van Staden relies on LeClerc to challenge alienage classifications in licensing. | LeClerc directly governs this scenario and supports rational basis. | LeClerc controls; classification upheld under rational basis. |
Key Cases Cited
- LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005) (alienage classifications: strict scrutiny generally applies only to permanent resident aliens)
- United States v. Lucio, 428 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (LPR application status does not confer permanent residence)
- Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (U.S. 1971) (discrete and insular minority rationale for heightened scrutiny of permanent residents)
- Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (U.S. 1938) (basis for heightened scrutiny of discrete and insular minorities)
- Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (U.S. 1982) (heightened rational basis in children of illegal aliens context)
- Virginia v. U.S., 518 U.S. 515 (U.S. 1996) (intermediate scrutiny not applicable to alienage classifications)
- Teague v. City of Flower Mound, 179 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 1999) (orderliness prevents panel from overruling prior panel; Teague principle)
- United States v. Thibodeaux, 211 F.3d 910 (5th Cir. 2000) (waiver principles in appellate arguments)