Van Poyck v. State, 116 So. 3d 347

Van Poyck, condemned to death, filed a third successive postconviction relief motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and a motion to vacate the death sentence or for an evidentiary hearing; the circuit court dismissed the 3.851 motion and denied the vacate/evidentiary motion.
He was convicted of first-degree murder for participating in the June 1987 killing of correctional officer Griffis during a scheme with co-defendant Valdes; the State presented evidence he instigated and played a major role in the felony murder.
On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court held the evidence supported a felony-murder conviction and death sentence was proportional, with multiple aggravators found and no mitigating factors sufficient to offset them.
Van Poyck previously filed multiple state and federal habeas petitions and postconviction motions, including earlier DNA testing and newly discovered evidence claims, all of which were rejected, culminating in the instant third successive motion.
In May 2013 the Governor signed a death warrant; Van Poyck filed the third successive postconviction motion and a motion to vacate or for an evidentiary hearing, which were denied.
The issue here centers on newly discovered evidence from Wanda Valdes (Frank Valdes’s widow) claiming Van Poyck was not the leader and that Valdes acted to shoot Griffis; the court assesses whether this evidence could have changed the sentence under 3.851.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether newly discovered evidence warrants a new sentencing proceeding	Valdes affidavit suggests Van Poyck was not the leader and not the trigger-man	Evidence would not probably yield a lesser sentence	No; affidavit would not probably yield a different result and is insufficient to grant relief
Whether the Valdes affidavit negates Enmund/Tison culpability	Valdes shows major role not as trigger-man, undermining Enmund/Tison	Van Poyck acted with major participation and reckless indifference	Death sentence remains supported by Enmund/Tison standard
Whether Van Poyck's claim of ineffective direct-appeal counsel is procedurally barred or meritless	Lasley ineffective per se due to mental illness/drug addiction	Claim previously rejected; evidence fails to show contemporaneous infirmities	Procedurally barred or without merit
Whether the third successive postconviction motion should be summarily denied	3.851(d)(2)(A) shows newly discovered evidence; entitlement to hearing	3.851(f)(5)(B) allows summary denial if no relief is shown	Summary denial proper; no probable impact on sentence

Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (U.S. (1982)) (felony murder culpability requires killing or intent to kill; death may be unconstitutional for non-triggerman)
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (U.S. (1987)) (major participation with reckless indifference satisfies Enmund)
Van Poyck v. State, 564 So.2d 1066 (Fla.1990) (direct appeal; proportionality of death sentence; major role in felony murder)
Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553 (Fla.2001) (newly discovered evidence standards; life-vs-death sentence probable impact)
Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911 (Fla.1991) (dormant rule for life-vs-death sentencing under newly discovered evidence)
Scott v. Dugger, 604 So.2d 465 (Fla.1992) (test for life-vs-death impact of new evidence)
McLin v. State, 827 So.2d 948 (Fla.2002) (standard for summarily denying 3.851 claims)