Van De Grift v. State
299 P.3d 1043
Utah2013Background
- Appellants were defrauded in a multi-state Ponzi scheme led by parolee Richard Higgins while he was on parole in Utah.
- Higgins’s parole condition prohibited leaving Utah, handling others’ money, or self-employment; alleged lack of adequate supervision enabled his extensive travel and schemes.
- Appellants sued the State for negligent supervision, gross negligence, failure to warn, and negligent misrepresentation.
- District court dismissed based on Governmental Immunity Act (GIA) immunities and deceit exception; state argued immunity under subsections (5)(b) and (j).
- Court held the deceit exception to immunity applies to third-party deceit, and affirmed dismissal; the incarceration exception was not necessary to decide.
- Standard of review: dismissals under immunity are reviewed for correctness as a question of law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does subsection (5)(b) apply to third-party deceit? | Appellants argued deceit must be by a state employee; third-party deceit falls outside (b). | State contends deceit exception covers deceit by any tortfeasor causing the injury, not just employees. | Yes; deceit exception applies to third-party deceit. |
| Is the deceit exception limited to deceit by government employees under the statute’s text? | Subsection (f) covers misrepresentation by an employee; deceit in (b) should be limited to government actors. | Textual plain language of (b) extends immunity for deceit regardless of tortfeasor identity; (f) is broader but not exclusive. | Deceit exception in (b) applies to third-party deceit; broader statutory text overrides employee-only interpretation. |
| Does Francis v. State distinguish the deceit and permit-related exceptions appropriately here? | Francis implied different reasoning; deceit/assault areas should depend on tort type, not trespass of permit. | Francis supports distinguishing permit-based exceptions from assault/deceit; here deceit arises from third-party conduct unrelated to a permit. | Francis is distinguishable; deceit exception applies here as framed by Ledfors/Taylor. |
| Do negligence claims (negligent supervision, failure to warn) fall under the deceit exception to immunity? | In Ledfors and Taylor, the risk-based test supported applicability where injury arises from risk; deceit causation suffices. | Immunity should not be read to immunize negligence unless the injury arises from deceit by a tortfeasor. | Subsection (b) applies; injury arose out of deceit, so immunity bars the claims. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ledfors v. Emery County School District, 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993) (plain-language approach: immunity covers assault/battery regardless of assailant's status)
- Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Ogden City School District, 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996) (treats assault/battery as exception to immunity; discusses broad scope of (b))
- Jones, Waldo, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Bennett, 2003 UT 9, 70 P.3d 17 (Utah) (defines deceit elements; clarifies scope of deceit under (b)/(f))
- Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1975) (analyzes deceit under governmental immunity context)
- Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985) (discusses negligence against government entities with immunity considerations)
- Malcolm v. State, 878 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1994) (immunity under assault/battery exceptions for parolee supervision cases)
- Francis v. State, 2010 UT 62, 248 P.3d 44 (Utah) (distinguishes permit exception from other subsections; relevance to agency action)