Van Arsdale v. Van Arsdale, 477 Mass. 218

Susan and William Van Arsdale divorced in 1997; their judgment incorporated an agreement requiring William to pay monthly alimony to Susan until death or remarriage, with a review provision upon William’s retirement.
In 2006 the parties modified the judgment: child support stopped and alimony increased to $7,571.26/month.
The Alimony Reform Act of 2011 created durational limits (presumptive termination dates) for alimony from marriages under 20 years, subject to rebuttal if continuation is “required in the interests of justice.” The Legislature allowed those durational limits to apply to some pre-Act judgments.
In 2015 William sought modification terminating alimony under the Act’s durational limits and due to his retirement; Susan counterclaimed and challenged the durational limits as unconstitutionally retroactive.
The Probate and Family Court terminated William’s alimony obligation under the Act’s durational limit, finding Susan failed to show deviation was required; Susan appealed directly to the SJC.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether applying the Act’s durational limits to pre-Act alimony agreements is unconstitutionally retroactive	Van Arsdale: application is retroactive and violates due process	Van Arsdale: durational limits create a rebuttable presumption and are not retroactive in the constitutional sense	Not unconstitutionally retroactive; presumption does not attach new legal consequences to pre-Act agreements
Whether the judge abused discretion by declining to deviate from the durational limits	Van Arsdale: facts warranted deviation because of her needs and circumstances	Van Arsdale: judge properly evaluated "here and now" circumstances and found no need to deviate	No abuse of discretion; judge reasonably found Susan could work, had significant assets, and lifestyle unchanged

Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (test for whether a statute attaches new legal consequences and is retroactive)
George v. George, 476 Mass. 65 (interpretation of "interests of justice" deviation standard and focus on parties’ current circumstances)
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3839 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 472 Mass. 492 (rebuttable presumption and prospective application where individual can avoid obligation)
Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 780 (statute unconstitutional where it imposed new consequences solely by virtue of prior conviction)
Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527 (application of Act provisions to pre-Act judgments)
Rodman v. Rodman, 470 Mass. 539 (discussing retroactivity of alimony provisions)
Holmes v. Holmes, 467 Mass. 653 (trial court discretion in modification and discussion of the Act)
Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 467 Mass. 598 (framework for assessing retroactivity challenges)
Tobin's Case, 424 Mass. 250 (rebuttable presumptions and due process)
Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286 (scope of trial court discretion in modification)