Vamsidhar Vurimindi v. Attorney General United States
46 F.4th 134
3rd Cir.2022Background
- Vamsidhar Vurimindi, an Indian native and lawful permanent resident since 2008, was convicted in Pennsylvania of two counts of misdemeanor stalking under 18 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 2709.1(a)(1) and sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment and supervised release.
- DHS initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (removal for a "crime of stalking"); because the INA does not define that term, the IJ applied the categorical approach and concluded Vurimindi’s Pennsylvania conviction matched the INA stalking offense.
- Vurimindi appealed to the BIA arguing the Pennsylvania statute is not a categorical match; the BIA initially (mistakenly) found he waived the argument, later denied his motions to reopen and for reconsideration, asserting the challenge was not raised earlier.
- The principal legal question is whether § 2709.1(a)(1) is divisible (two alternative mens rea elements) or indivisible (one mens rea element with alternative means): the statute criminalizes conduct demonstrating either intent to place a person in reasonable fear of bodily injury or to cause substantial emotional distress.
- The Third Circuit considered whether to remand to the BIA and, concluding remand was unnecessary because the issues are purely legal and involve state-law interpretation, proceeded to decide the merits: it held the Pennsylvania statute is indivisible and thus broader than the BIA’s generic stalking (which requires intent to cause fear of bodily injury or death), so Vurimindi’s conviction is not a removable offense.
Issues
| Issue | Vurimindi's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court should remand to the BIA to decide divisibility | Court may decide in first instance; remand unnecessary because issue is purely legal and no factfinding required | Implicitly favored remand for agency to decide | Court declined to remand; resolved issue itself (remand unnecessary) |
| Whether § 2709.1(a)(1) is divisible (elements vs. alternative means as to mens rea) | Statute is indivisible: single intent element shown by either intent-to-instill-fear or intent-to-cause-emotional-distress (alternative means) | Statute is divisible: two alternative mens rea elements, one of which (intent to place in reasonable fear of bodily injury) matches INA stalking | Court held statute is indivisible; the disjunctive phrases are alternative means, not separate elements |
| Whether Pennsylvania stalking is a categorical match to INA "crime of stalking" | Not a categorical match because PA statute covers nonphysical-intent (substantial emotional distress) beyond BIA’s generic stalking (fear of bodily injury/death) | If divisible, the variant matching intent-to-cause-fear would permit removal; conceded non-removability if indivisible | Because statute is indivisible and sweeps more broadly than the BIA’s generic stalking, PA conviction is not a removable offense |
Key Cases Cited
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (establishes categorical approach framework)
- Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (distinguishes elements from means; divisibility inquiry)
- INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (remand-to-agency principles)
- Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462 (permitted court to apply categorical approach in first instance)
- Singh v. Att’y Gen., 839 F.3d 273 (similar refusal to remand when issues are purely legal)
- United States v. Gonzalez, 905 F.3d 165 (interpreting disjunctive mens rea as alternative means in analogous stalking statute)
- Salmoran v. Att’y Gen., 909 F.3d 73 (no deference to BIA on state-law parsing; plenary review)
- NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (remand unnecessary when agency action would be idle)