Vail v. String
2019 Ohio 984
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- Vail and String divorced in 1993; their separation agreement (incorporated into the 1993 decree) required them to share certain Ohio public university costs (tuition, room, board, books, lab fees) in a ratio reflecting their income when their daughter Abigail reached college age.
- In 2002 the parties entered a settlement incorporated into a 2002 agreed judgment resolving substantial child support arrears by a $30,000 payment from String and containing an integration clause limited to “the support of Abigail.”
- Abigail attended Miami University 2007–2011. Vail later sought contribution from String for college expenses, claiming over $200,000 in costs (loans and out‑of‑pocket). String asserted the 2002 agreement extinguished any obligation and later made an unconditional tender (about $17,783) based on his calculation.
- The trial court held, as a matter of law, the 2002 agreement did not extinguish the 1993 college‑expense obligation because that obligation was not “child support” and the 2002 integration clause addressed only past child‑support arrears.
- After a hearing the court found $93,194 in includable college expenses, allocated shares using 2007 incomes (Vail 77.9%, String 22.1), entered judgment for String’s share $20,596 plus $4,588 prejudgment interest (from May 31, 2011), denied contempt and denied attorney‑fee awards to either side.
Issues
| Issue | Vail’s Argument | String’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2002 agreement superseded the 1993 college‑expense obligation | 2002 resolved only past arrears and did not modify future college‑cost promise | 2002 was an integrated settlement of “support of Abigail,” extinguishing prior college‑expense promise | 2002 did not abrogate the 1993 college‑expense obligation; obligation survives because college costs are not child support and 2002 addressed past arrears only |
| Whether String should be held in contempt for failing to pay college costs | Vail: contempt appropriate because obligation existed and String failed to pay | String: lacked clear notice of specific amounts; disputed obligation; later tendered funds | No contempt; court found Vail/Abigail never presented a sum‑certain bill before litigation, so clear‑and‑convincing proof of disobedience lacking |
| Proper income measure and year for allocating expense ratio | Use incomes for each college year or use Vail’s “total income” after deducting business expenses | Use 2007 incomes (income when Abigail reached college age); use gross wages reported on tax return | Used 2007 incomes and line‑7 wages for each party; declined to deduct Vail’s claimed business losses absent substantiation |
| Whether prejudgment interest should run and from what date | Interest should not run until court fixed amount (trial judgment date) | Interest runs from when obligation became due (Abigail’s graduation) | Interest awarded from May 31, 2011 (approximate graduation date); court found obligation became due when daughter graduated |
| Whether attorney fees should be awarded | Vail: mandatory fees under R.C. 3109.05(C) or discretionary fees under R.C. 3105.73(B) because she prevailed | String: seeks fees for defending meritless motion; alternatively denies he should pay | Neither party awarded fees; 3109.05(C) inapplicable because college costs are not child support; discretionary fee award denied as court found both sides contributed to protracted litigation |
Key Cases Cited
- Kelly v. Med. Life Ins. Co., 31 Ohio St.3d 130 (interpretation of contracts; intent resides in contract language)
- Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241 (contract language given plain ordinary meaning; read as a whole)
- Ed Schory & Sons, Inc. v. Soc. Natl. Bank, 75 Ohio St.3d 433 (integrated writing precludes parol evidence)
- Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216 (when contract language ambiguous courts may consider extrinsic evidence)
- Trinova Corp. v. Pilkington Bros., 70 Ohio St.3d 271 (subsequent contract does not supersede unambiguous prior terms absent specific intent)
- Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (clear and convincing evidence standard defined)
- Foster Wheeler Enviresponse v. Franklin Cty. Convention Facilities Auth., 78 Ohio St.3d 353 (ambiguity is not shown by hardship; rules for contract interpretation)
- Royal Elec. Constr. v. Ohio State Univ., 73 Ohio St.3d 110 (disputed or uncalculated obligations may still be due and payable for interest purposes)