810 S.E.2d 880
Va.2018Background
- VEPCO is the incumbent utility with exclusive service territory; DES is a licensed competitive service provider (CSP).
- DES petitioned the State Corporation Commission (SCC) seeking a declaration that large customers may buy 100% renewable electricity from a CSP under Va. Code § 56‑577(A)(5).
- Section 56‑577(A)(3) permits large customers (demand >5 MW) to buy from CSPs but requires five years' advance written notice to return to the incumbent utility; (A)(5) permits any retail customer to buy 100% renewable energy from a CSP and contains no notice requirement.
- The SCC initially and on reconsideration held that (A)(5) independently allows purchases of 100% renewable energy by any retail customer (including large customers) without the (A)(3) five‑year notice restriction.
- VEPCO appealed, arguing the SCC erred by allowing large customers to use (A)(5) to avoid (A)(3)’s notice requirement and by failing to harmonize the provisions so the specific (A)(3) controls.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether large customers who qualify under §56‑577(A)(3) may purchase 100% renewable energy under §56‑577(A)(5) | DES/Appalachian Voices: (A)(5) is independent and applies to all retail customers regardless of size | VEPCO: (A)(3) governs large‑customer purchases; (A)(5) cannot be used to bypass (A)(3) | Court: Yes—(A)(5) independently permits purchases by any retail customer, including large customers, if (A)(5)’s conditions are met |
| Whether the five‑year notice requirement in (A)(3) applies to purchases made under (A)(5) | DES: (A)(3)’s notice applies only to purchases under (A)(3) | VEPCO: The notice is a more specific rule and should control to prevent circumvention | Court: Notice in (A)(3) applies only to purchases made under (A)(3); (A)(5) contains no notice requirement |
| Whether the phrase “subject to the provisions of subdivisions 4 and 5” in (A)(3) limits (A)(5)’s applicability to large customers | VEPCO: Phrase shows (A)(3) is primary for large customers and others are exceptions | DES/Appalachian Voices: Phrase does not exclude (A)(3) customers from (A)(5) | Court: The phrase does not make (A)(3) exclusive; (A)(5) is a separate statutory avenue |
| Whether SCC properly interpreted and harmonized the statutory scheme | VEPCO: SCC should have applied specific‑over‑general canon to give (A)(3) effect | SCC/DES: Statutes are clear; no conflict exists; apply plain meaning | Court: Affirmed SCC—statutory language is clear and unambiguous; different purchase options can impose different requirements |
Key Cases Cited
- Covel v. Town of Vienna, 280 Va. 151 (2010) (rules for harmonizing general and specific statutes)
- Appalachian Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 284 Va. 695 (2012) (standard of review for SCC statutory interpretation)
- Appalachian Voices v. State Corp. Comm'n, 277 Va. 509 (2009) (deference to agency construction)
- Lynchburg Div. of Soc. Servs. v. Cook, 276 Va. 465 (2008) (specific statute prevails over general when in conflict)
- Smith v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 449 (2011) (apply plain statutory language when unambiguous)
- Donnelly v. Donatelli & Klein, Inc., 258 Va. 171 (1999) (meaning of "subject to")
- Cuccinelli v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 283 Va. 420 (2012) (ascertain legislative intent; plain‑meaning rule)
- Commonwealth v. Amerson, 281 Va. 414 (2011) (statutory construction principles)
- Kozmina v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 347 (2011) (plain meaning controls when statute unambiguous)