v. Williams
2019 COA 118
Colo. Ct. App.2019Background
- Robert D. Gandy, a Canadian citizen serving a habitual‑criminal life sentence in Colorado, applied in 2015 to be transferred to Canada under an international prisoner‑transfer treaty and CDOC Admin. Reg. 550‑05; the CDOC denied his request.
- Gandy sued in 2016; on prior appeal (Gandy IV) this court held AR 550‑05 required the Director of Prisons to forward his application to the Executive Director for final review and remanded for that act.
- After remand the CDOC amended AR 550‑05; the Executive Director reviewed and again denied Gandy’s transfer, citing a pattern of sexually deviant behavior and the inmate’s need for sex‑offender‑specific treatment before transfer.
- Gandy sought to amend his complaint to challenge the post‑remand denial and to add several claims (mandamus, APA, equal protection, fiduciary duty, First Amendment retaliation); the district court denied leave to amend and closed the case.
- The court of appeals (Division VII) affirms: it holds AR 550‑05 entitles an inmate to review by the Executive Director but makes transfer discretionary, and the Executive Director permissibly considered Gandy’s need for treatment in denying transfer.
Issues
| Issue | Gandy’s Argument | Williams (CDOC) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether district court abused discretion in denying leave to amend after remand | Gandy asserted a right to amend as of course under C.R.C.P. 15(a) and alleged exhaustion of administrative remedies for new claims | Defendants argued amendments were futile and the court could deny leave under Rules 15(a)/(d) after final judgment | Denial was within court’s discretion; Gandy’s right to amend as of course ended with the earlier final judgment, so leave to amend was discretionary |
| 2) Whether Gandy exhausted administrative remedies before amending | Gandy alleged he exhausted remedies for the new claims and pleaded the exhaustion facts in his amended complaint | Defendants argued exhaustion must precede filing and challenged sufficiency | Court holds Gandy alleged sufficient exhaustion for the new claims at pleading stage; district court erred to the extent it denied amendment solely for lack of alleged exhaustion |
| 3) Whether CDOC’s denial violated AR 550‑05, statute, or treaty (mandamus/abuse of discretion) | Gandy argued AR 550‑05 and the treaty create a mandatory right to transfer when written eligibility criteria are met (so mandamus appropriate) | Defendants argued transfer is a privilege under AR 550‑05, vested in Executive Director/Governor discretion, and denial here was supported by treatment needs | AR 550‑05 provides only procedural rights (review and notice); transfer is discretionary. Mandamus was futile and abuse‑of‑discretion review fails because the Executive Director’s treatment‑based rationale has record support |
| 4) Whether transfer/relocation claims (equal protection; First Amendment retaliation) were viable | Gandy claimed unequal treatment (sex‑offender requirement) and retaliation for litigation activity (move to less‑desirable facility caused economic loss/top bunk risks) | Defendants argued sex offenders are not similarly situated to violent offenders; the transfer had legitimate programming reasons and alleged harms were not sufficiently adverse to show chilling or retaliatory motive | Equal protection claim fails because Gandy is not similarly situated to non‑sex offenders; retaliation claim fails because alleged harms are not objectively chilling and transfer plausibly motivated by programming/treatment timing |
Key Cases Cited
- Grear v. Mulvihill, 207 P.3d 918 (Colo. App. 2009) (motion to dismiss generally not a responsive pleading for amendment rule)
- Wilcox v. Reconditioned Office Sys. of Colo., Inc., 881 P.2d 398 (Colo. App. 1994) (final judgment after dismissal terminates right to amend as of course)
- Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Carney, 97 P.3d 961 (Colo. 2004) (trial court has discretion to permit amendments after appellate remand)
- Eagle River Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Dist. Court, 647 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1982) (Rules 15(a) and 15(d) governed by same considerations)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (complaint must state a plausible claim)
- Whitman, ACLU of Colo. v. Whitman, 159 P.3d 707 (Colo. App. 2006) (amendment is futile if it cannot survive a motion to dismiss)
- Gramiger v. Crowley, 660 P.2d 1279 (Colo. 1983) (mandamus standards: clear right, clear duty, no other remedy)
- Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002) (exhaustion rationale: administrative correction may obviate litigation)
- Reeves v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 155 P.3d 648 (Colo. App. 2007) (CDOC has broad discretion over prison management)
- Buenabenta v. Neet, 160 P.3d 290 (Colo. App. 2007) (review of prison administrative decisions limited; upheld if record support exists)
- Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 1998) (inmate not insulated from normal conditions of confinement; courts reluctant to micromanage prison operations)
- Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2018) (retaliation: objective chilling standard and required proof of retaliatory motive)