2020 COA 44
Colo. Ct. App.2020Background
- Defendant Benjamin Weeks was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of menacing; at sentencing the prosecutor asked the court to leave restitution open.
- The court said it would “leave restitution open for 91 days,” and set response/reply deadlines if a motion were filed.
- Nine days after sentencing the People moved for $524.19 as an "interim amount," noting possible further investigation; Weeks filed an objection; neither party requested a hearing.
- Briefing was complete well before the statutory 91-day deadline, but the court did not rule for more than eleven months and ultimately ordered the $524.19.
- The trial court justified the delay by finding an implicit showing of “good cause” based on its sentencing procedure; Weeks appealed.
- The Court of Appeals vacated the restitution order, holding the court must either order restitution within 91 days or make an adequate finding of good cause/extenuating circumstances to extend the deadline; the People’s mere request for additional time to investigate is not automatically good cause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 91-day deadline in § 18-1.3-603(1)(b) requires the court to enter a restitution amount within 91 days or only governs the prosecutor’s time to request restitution | The 91-day period governs the prosecutor’s obligation to present restitution information, not the court’s duty to enter an order | The statute requires the court to determine and enter a specific restitution amount within 91 days unless good cause is shown | Court: “determined” refers to the court’s duty to set the restitution amount within 91 days absent good cause; prosecutor’s interpretation would render subsection (1)(b) superfluous |
| Whether an order extending the prosecutor’s time to file restitution automatically constitutes “good cause” to extend the court’s 91-day deadline | An extension for the People to file restitution implicitly supplies good cause for the court to delay ruling | The court must make an explicit, adequate finding of good cause based on the case facts; the People’s request alone is insufficient | Court: extension for the People may support a good-cause finding but does not automatically equal good cause; the trial court must articulate factual grounds |
| Whether the trial court’s post-hoc, implicit finding of good cause sufficed where briefing completed long before the statutory deadline | The court’s sentencing procedure and order leaving restitution open impliedly established good cause | Weeks: no factual showing of good cause; briefing completed well before the deadline, so no justification for the delay | Court: the record lacked explanation of specific good cause for the long delay; cannot infer good cause; reversal required |
| Whether the 91-day deadline applies to restitution determinations on remand after appeal | (People argued applicability was limited) | Weeks: 91-day requirement governs initial post-conviction determinations | Court: the 91-day limit applies to initial determinations; it does not apply in the same way to determinations made after remand on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Belibi, 415 P.3d 301 (explaining that § 18-1.3-603(1)(b) requires the specific restitution amount be set within 91 days)
- Meza v. People, 415 P.3d 303 (discussing reserving findings as to other victims or losses within 91 days)
- Sanoff v. People, 187 P.3d 576 (Colo. 2008) (equating court’s jurisdiction to set restitution with its jurisdiction to determine the amount)
- People v. McCann, 122 P.3d 1085 (Colo. App. 2005) (distinguishing extenuating circumstances for the prosecutor from good cause for the court)
- People v. Harman, 97 P.3d 290 (Colo. App. 2004) (discussing separate standards for late prosecution submissions and late court determinations)
- People v. Gillett, 629 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1981) (defining "good cause")
- People v. Rockne, 315 P.3d 172 (Colo. App. 2012) (explaining limits on the 91-day period after prior awards or remand)