v. Taylor
2018 COA 175
Colo. Ct. App.2018Background
- Christopher Taylor was convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses; his direct appeal was affirmed.
- He sought trial transcripts at state expense to prepare a Crim. P. 35(c) postconviction motion; the transcript request was denied.
- Taylor filed a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion raising seven ineffective-assistance and related claims; the postconviction court denied relief and counsel, and an appellate division affirmed (Taylor II).
- Taylor then filed a second pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion (later amended and supplemented by appointed counsel) that renewed some prior claims and asserted new claims; the prosecution argued the new claims were successive.
- The postconviction court denied the renewed claims as successive under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI) and rejected the new claims on the merits, concluding Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII) might supersede prior case law but denying relief on other grounds; this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether claims raised in the second Crim. P. 35(c) motion that were asserted in the first motion are barred as "raised and resolved" under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI) | The renewed claims are barred as already raised and resolved | Taylor contends he did not meaningfully "raise" or could not fully present claims because he was pro se and lacked transcripts | Court: Claims were "raised" and "resolved"; barred under (c)(3)(VI) |
| Whether new claims in the second Crim. P. 35(c) motion are barred as successive under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII) | (State) New claims are barred because (c)(3)(VII) forbids claims that could have been presented previously | Taylor invokes Hubbard/Naranjo: pro se defendants may file a second motion raising new claims; lack of transcripts and pro se status excuse the bar | Court: (c)(3)(VII) supersedes Hubbard/Naranjo; omission of any pro se exception is intentional; new claims barred under (c)(3)(VII) |
| Whether pro se status at time of first motion creates exception to successive-motion bar | (State) Procedural rule applies to pro se litigants; no exception | Taylor argues pro se filing prevents fair presentation and preserves right to raise new claims later | Court: Pro se status does not create an exception; defendants must follow procedural rules |
| Whether lack of access to trial transcripts excuses filing new claims in a second motion | (State) Lack of transcripts is not an enumerated exception; does not excuse later filing | Taylor argues he lacked transcripts and could not identify/raise claims initially | Court: Lack of transcripts is not a constitutional right or enumerated exception and does not permit second-motion claims |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Naranjo, 738 P.2d 407 (Colo. App. 1987) (permitting second Crim. P. 35 motion to raise new claims when first motion was filed pro se)
- People v. Hubbard, 519 P.2d 945 (Colo. 1974) (supreme court requiring inclusion of constitutional claims in a single postconviction motion when counsel represents defendant)
- Jurgevich v. Dist. Court, 907 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1995) (no constitutional right to a free transcript for collateral attack)
- Lloyd v. Van Natta, 296 F.3d 630 (7th Cir. 2002) (unavailability of transcript does not justify equitable tolling for habeas filing)