2020 COA 158
Colo. Ct. App.2020Background
- In June 2012 defendant Franky Lamont Session arrived at a hospital with gunshot wounds; a bag of cocaine fell from his clothing and police charged him with drug offenses.
- In June 2014 a jury convicted Session of possession of more than four grams of a schedule II controlled substance (class 4/level 4 felony) and acquitted him on a distribution charge.
- The trial court adjudicated Session a habitual criminal based on that conviction plus five prior felony convictions (three drug-related convictions and convictions for second-degree burglary and attempted second-degree burglary) and sentenced him to 24 years.
- Session made multiple requests to substitute appointed counsel before trial; the trial court denied those requests and also had a judge (not a jury) adjudicate the habitual criminal counts.
- The Colorado Court of Appeals originally affirmed; the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Melton, Wells-Yates, and McRae.
- On remand the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the conviction, rejected the substitution-of-counsel and jury-adjudication claims, but held that under Wells-Yates drug possession and (on reconsideration) second-degree burglary/attempted burglary are not per se grave and serious, so the habitual sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for a fact-specific proportionality review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial court denial of substitution of appointed counsel | Court properly exercised discretion; no constitutional violation | Session argued the court failed to adequately inquire and denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel | Denial was not an abuse of discretion: motions were late, court had written motions/statements to evaluate complaints, and record showed no total breakdown in communication |
| Right to a jury trial for habitual adjudication | Prior-conviction exception permits judge to make the habitual findings | Session argued Alleyne and related rulings eliminate the prior-conviction exception and require a jury | Rejected; prior-conviction exception remains controlling for habitual-adjudication facts and judge adjudication did not violate the Sixth Amendment |
| Whether predicate offenses are per se "grave or serious" for abbreviated proportionality review | Court need not perform individualized review if any predicate is per se grave or serious | Session argued his triggering and predicate offenses are not per se grave or serious under Wells-Yates and thus require proportionality review | Held that none of Session's triggering or predicate offenses (drug possession, 2d-degree burglary, attempted 2d-degree burglary) are per se grave or serious under Wells-Yates; sentence vacated and remanded for abbreviated (and if warranted, extended) proportionality review |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (principle that facts increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; prior-conviction exception)
- Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (Apprendi principles reaffirmed)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (clarified facts increasing mandatory minimum must be jury-found; did not eliminate Apprendi prior-conviction exception)
- Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (Eighth Amendment proportionality framework)
- People v. Deroulet, 48 P.3d 520 (Colo. 2002) (prior Colorado precedent treating burglary as per se grave or serious)
- Close v. People, 48 P.3d 528 (Colo. 2002) (prior Colorado precedent treating attempted burglary as per se grave or serious)
- Wells-Yates v. People, 2019 CO 90M (announced standard that a crime is per se grave or serious only if it is grave or serious in every potential factual scenario)
- People v. Gaskins, 825 P.2d 30 (Colo. 1992) (trial court uniquely suited to make factual proportionality determinations)
- Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005) (discussed the prior-conviction exception)
- People v. Nunn, 148 P.3d 222 (Colo. App. 2006) (elements the prosecution must prove to establish habitual status)
- People v. Huber, 139 P.3d 628 (Colo. 2006) (discussing Apprendi and prior-conviction exception)
- People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686 (Colo. 2010) (factors for evaluating substitution-of-counsel requests)
- People v. Argaello, 772 P.2d 87 (Colo. 1989) (indigent defendant has right to counsel but not to a particular attorney)
