2018 COA 158
Colo. Ct. App.2018Background
- Defendant Matthew Ray was ordered to pay $19,855.91 restitution after a second-degree assault conviction; the restitution order stated interest would accrue at 12% per annum from the date of entry.
- In 2014–2015 the Colorado Judicial Department implemented a uniform administrative policy to assess interest monthly at 1% to correct inconsistent past practice and ensure uniform application.
- In July 2015 clerks sent letters notifying defendants (including Ray) that interest would be added at 1% per month on outstanding restitution balances.
- Ray asked the trial court for a declaratory order that the Judicial Department lacked statutory authority to charge interest monthly; the trial court denied relief, accepting the Department’s monthly-assessment method as consistent with a 12% per annum rate.
- Ray appealed; the Court of Appeals reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and affirmed, holding the statute ambiguous and the Department’s monthly assessment lawful.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the phrase “twelve percent per annum” forbids monthly interest assessments | State/JA: statute sets an annual rate; administrative monthly assessment that yields no more than 12% annually is permissible | Ray: “per annum” means interest payable only once per year; monthly charging impermissible and increases punishment | Court: Statute is ambiguous; "per annum" measures rate, not frequency; monthly 1% assessments consistent with a 12% annual rate and lawful |
| Whether monthly assessment frustrates legislative purpose of encouraging expeditious payment | JA: monthly assessment furthers expeditious payment and uniformity across districts | Ray: monthly interest unfairly burdens defendants and does not help indigent or incarcerated defendants | Court: Monthly assessment better promotes prompt payment and does not conflict with legislative intent |
| Whether administrative policy exceeds Judicial Department authority or modifies statute | JA: administrative procedure is within court-administration authority and does not alter statute | Ray: policy effectively changes statutory payment timing and increases financial burden | Court: Policy does not contravene statute; judicial branch may administer and collect reasonable sums |
| Whether rule of lenity or other interpretive tools require ruling for defendant | JA: legislative intent discernible; lenity unnecessary | Ray: ambiguity must be resolved in defendant’s favor | Held: Court discerns intent via interpretation tools; rule of lenity not invoked |
Key Cases Cited
- Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083 (Colo. 2011) (statutory interpretation: give effect to plain and ordinary meaning)
- Roberts v. People, 130 P.3d 1005 (Colo. 2006) (post-judgment interest promotes expeditious payment of restitution)
- Gustin v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 152 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1945) ("per annum" denotes rate over time, not payment frequency)
- Quinlan v. Koch Oil Co., 25 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 1994) (presumption that statutory interest is simple absent express statement of compounding)
- Pena v. Dist. Court, 681 P.2d 953 (Colo. 1984) (judicial branch authority to determine and compel payment of sums necessary to administer courts)