2021 COA 90
Colo. Ct. App.2021Background
- Five (then-incarcerated or formerly incarcerated) medically vulnerable Colorado prisoners sued Governor Jared Polis and the CDOC executive director, alleging COVID-19 conditions in CDOC facilities violate article II, § 20 (cruel and unusual punishments) of the Colorado Constitution.
- Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief ordering population reductions or other measures to mitigate COVID-19 risk; they alternatively sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Governor to use statutory emergency powers.
- The Governor moved to dismiss, arguing he was an improper defendant, the separation-of-powers doctrine deprived the court of jurisdiction to review his discretionary inaction, and mandamus cannot compel discretionary action.
- The trial court dismissed the complaint (ruling the Governor improper and that separation of powers precluded declaratory/injunctive relief directing executive action).
- The Court of Appeals reversed: (1) under Raven v. Polis the Governor is a proper defendant for CDOC conditions claims; (2) separation-of-powers does not bar judicial review of alleged constitutional violations or entry of declaratory/injunctive relief (though courts may not order pardons/commutations); and (3) it declined to decide availability of mandamus on the undeveloped record and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper defendant? | Governor may be sued for CDOC conditions; he has authority over state agencies | Governor not proper because he does not manage day-to-day operations of CDOC | Governor is a proper defendant (Raven controls) |
| Separation of powers — jurisdiction to review alleged inaction? | Courts can review executive inaction that results in constitutional violations (Eighth Amendment/de1iberate indifference principles) | Separation of powers prevents courts from commanding discretionary executive responses to emergencies | Court has jurisdiction to evaluate constitutionality of executive conduct and may provide declaratory/injunctive relief; separation doctrine does not bar review |
| May court order depopulation or releases? | Plaintiffs request depopulation or other remedies to mitigate risk | Ordering releases or pardons intrudes on Governor's exclusive prerogatives (pardons, discretionary emergency decisions) | Court cannot order pardons/commutations but may require remedying constitutional violations while leaving choice of specific remedies to the Governor/agency |
| Mandamus under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2)? | Seek writ compelling Governor to use § 24-33.5-704 emergency powers | Mandamus cannot compel discretionary executive acts; alternative remedies exist | Court declined to decide on mandamus now (may be addressed on remand) |
Key Cases Cited
- Goebel v. Colorado Department of Institutions, 764 P.2d 785 (Colo. 1988) (courts may interpret law and direct defendants to spend appropriated funds to meet legal requirements; remedial orders need not violate separation of powers)
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment)
- Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011) (depriving prisoners of adequate medical care violates the Constitution; courts may fashion remedies)
- Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980) (systemic deficiencies showing denial of adequate medical care can establish deliberate indifference in class actions)
- Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (federal courts have jurisdiction to decide constitutional violations despite separation-of-powers defenses)
- Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (scope of district court’s equitable powers to remedy constitutional violations is broad)
- McClure v. Dist. Ct., 532 P.2d 340 (Colo. 1975) (Governor’s power to grant pardons/commutations is exclusive and courts cannot command pardons)
- People ex rel. Dunbar v. Dist. Ct., 502 P.2d 420 (Colo. 1972) (recognizing exclusive executive clemency powers)
- Crowe v. Tull, 126 P.3d 196 (Colo. 2006) (separation-of-powers doctrine prevents one branch from exercising powers exclusive to another, but branches’ powers may overlap)
- People v. Gaskins, 825 P.2d 30 (Colo. 1992) (Colorado treats article II, § 20 as equivalent to the Eighth Amendment)