Background

• In 2000 McCulley pled guilty to two separate unlawful‑sexual‑behavior charges: a class 4 felony (deferred judgment) and a class 1 misdemeanor (judgment entered); sex‑offender registration was required.
• He successfully completed the deferred judgment in 2004; the felony plea was withdrawn and the charge dismissed, leaving only the misdemeanor conviction.
• In 2016 McCulley petitioned under SORA §16‑22‑113 to discontinue registration; the People argued he was ineligible under §16‑22‑113(3)(c) because SORA defines “conviction” to include “having received a deferred judgment.”
• The trial court and the court of appeals agreed with the People and denied relief; the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari.
• The Supreme Court reversed: it held that, in the context of §16‑22‑113(3)(c), a successfully completed deferred judgment is not a “conviction,” so McCulley has only one conviction and may petition to deregister; a dissent argued the statutory definition controls and would render him ineligible.

Issues

Key Cases Cited

• People v. Perry, 252 P.3d 45 (Colo. App. 2010) (construed SORA contextually and held a completed deferred judgment is not encompassed by "is convicted" in §16‑22‑113(3)(b))
• M.T. v. People, 269 P.3d 1219 (Colo. 2012) (acceptance of a guilty plea can yield a conviction during the pendency of a deferred judgment)
• Hafelfinger v. Dist. Court, 674 P.2d 375 (Colo. 1984) (a successfully completed deferred judgment generally no longer constitutes a conviction)
• Doubleday v. People, 364 P.3d 193 (Colo. 2016) (rules of statutory construction: give statutory words plain meaning and read provisions in context)