2020 CO 13
Colo.2020Background
- Stephen J. Ziegler (through his revocable trust) owns four adjoining mountain parcels in Park County; one contains a house (classified residential), three are vacant and taxed as vacant land.
- Subject Parcel 1 directly borders the residential parcel; Subject Parcels 2 and 3 border Parcel 1 but do not touch the residential parcel (a public road may separate some parcels).
- Ziegler petitioned to reclassify the three vacant parcels as "residential land" under § 39-1-102(14.4)(a); the Park County BCC denied the petition and the Board of Assessment Appeals (BAA) upheld that denial using Assessors’ Reference Library (ARL) guidelines.
- The BAA found the vacant parcels were not "essential to enjoyment" of the residence and that claimed uses could be conducted on the residential lot; Ziegler appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court under C.A.R. 50.
- The Supreme Court, relying on companion decisions, addressed (1) whether "contiguous parcels" must physically touch and (2) whether the BAA applied the correct legal standard for the "used as a unit" requirement; it reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ziegler) | Defendant's Argument (County / BAA) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "contiguous parcels" under § 39-1-102(14.4)(a) may be non‑touching but enclosed in a continuous boundary (i.e., whether intervening parcels can create contiguity) | Contiguity can be satisfied by an assemblage that can be bounded continuously (analogy to the forty-eight contiguous states); non-touching parcels that are joined through an interim parcel should qualify. | Contiguity requires physical touching; intervening parcels do not automatically create contiguity for non-touching parcels unless each parcel physically touches a parcel containing a residential improvement under the majority’s interpretation. | The Court holds that "contiguous" requires physical touching and, for multi‑parcel assemblages, a vacant parcel must physically touch another parcel that contains a residential improvement to satisfy the contiguity requirement; remand for findings. |
| Whether the BAA correctly applied the "used as a unit" requirement (did it properly require the vacant parcels to be "essential" to enjoyment of the residence) | Ziegler: the statute requires that parcels be "used as a unit in conjunction with the residential improvements" — collective residential use suffices; not every parcel must contain an improvement or be "essential." | BAA/County: applied ARL guideline treating parcels as requiring "integral" or even "essential" uses tied to the residence; uses that could be conducted on the residential lot do not qualify. | The Court (following Hogan) rejects the BAA's "essential" standard: parcels need only be used together as a collective unit for residential purposes to satisfy "used as a unit." The BAA erred and must reapply the correct standard on remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- Roaring Fork Club, LLC v. Pitkin Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 342 P.3d 467 (Colo. App.) (standard of review for BAA orders: de novo for legal questions; factual findings are given deference)
- Huddleston v. Grand Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 913 P.2d 15 (Colo.) (assessors must follow materials produced by the Property Tax Administrator, including the ARL)
- Boulder Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. HealthSouth Corp., 246 P.3d 948 (Colo.) (courts will not add words to a statute)
- Trujillo v. Colo. Div. of Ins., 320 P.3d 1208 (Colo.) (same canon: do not add words to statutory text)
- Carrera v. People, 449 P.3d 725 (Colo.) (reject statutory interpretations that lead to absurd results)
- Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. S.T. Spano Greenhouses, Inc., 155 P.3d 422 (Colo. App.) (BAA orders may be set aside if they fail to follow the statutory scheme)