2020 COA 108
Colo. Ct. App.2020Background
- Defendant Damon D. Newman was convicted of sexual assault (armed with a deadly weapon) after a DNA match; sentenced to 32 years to life.
- After verdict and before sentencing, juror S.P. submitted a sworn affidavit alleging juror M.O. (a practicing attorney) introduced legal definitions and outside research during deliberations and urged inferences harmful to Newman.
- The trial court denied Newman’s motion for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing, concluding the alleged statements were not admissible under CRE 606(b).
- The Court of Appeals addressed whether a juror-lawyer’s comments constituted “extraneous prejudicial information” under CRE 606(b), focusing on what qualifies as “legal content.”
- The court held that, for CRE 606(b) purposes, “legal content” means a statement of law that is inconsistent with or supplemental to the court’s instructions, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on two alleged statements (a character-evidence definition and an assertion about implications of a buccal swab).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Definition of “legal content” under CRE 606(b) | People argued the trial court properly excluded juror testimony as not falling into an exception | Newman argued juror-lawyer introduced extraneous legal content during deliberations | Court defined “legal content” as a statement of law that contradicts or supplements the court’s instructions (narrow reading) |
| Whether affidavit warranted an evidentiary hearing re: juror supplying a definition of character evidence | People conceded affidavit alleged a juror-produced legal definition but disputed prejudice | Newman argued the affidavit showed outside legal material about character evidence was presented and could prejudice a typical juror | Court held affidavit presented competent evidence admissible under CRE 606(b) that warranted an evidentiary hearing on this claim |
| Whether juror statements about significance of Newman’s buccal swab were extraneous legal content | People: these were factual inferences from the record, not statements of law | Newman: juror-lawyer reinforced improper factual/legal conclusions about prior offenses | Court held the buccal-swab remarks were factual conclusions (not legal content) and thus not admissible as extraneous information |
| Other alleged statements (prior bad-acts admissibility, ineffective counsel/perjury risk, witness persistence, hung jury consequences) | People: most alleged remarks were opinion/inference or not relevant legal instructions | Newman: all statements tended to prejudice credibility and verdict | Court held most of these were nonlegal opinion or not relevant to issues before jury and therefore not extraneous legal content; remand limited to the two claims above; if hearing shows prejudice, grant new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Kendrick v. Pippin, 252 P.3d 1052 (Colo. 2011) (framework for determining extraneous prejudicial information and limits on juror testimony)
- People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616 (Colo. 2005) (two-step inquiry: whether extraneous information was before jury and whether it posed reasonable possibility of prejudice)
- People v. Wadle, 97 P.3d 932 (Colo. 2004) (trial court’s discretion in new-trial rulings and prejudice standard)
- Wiser v. People, 732 P.2d 1139 (Colo. 1987) (juror consultation of extraneous definitions is improper)
- Niemand v. District Court, 684 P.2d 931 (Colo. 1984) (juror independent research into legal definitions is misconduct)
- Alvarez v. People, 653 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1982) (dictionary consultation to interpret court instructions is improper)
- People v. Holt, 266 P.3d 442 (Colo. App. 2011) (distinguishing permissible juror opinion from extraneous legal content)
- Garcia v. People, 997 P.2d 1 (Colo. 2000) (favoring secrecy of deliberations and narrow construction of exceptions)
- In re Stankewitz, 708 P.2d 1260 (Cal. 1985) (defining “extraneous law” as law not given in court instructions)