2019 COA 185
Colo. Ct. App.2019Background
- Plaintiffs Paul and Terry Andrews contracted with Interior Living Designs LLC (ILD) for flooring; they sued ILD and its president Mark Miller for breach, civil theft, and veil-piercing after alleged non‑delivery.
- Defendants moved to dismiss and to compel arbitration based on a contract arbitration clause.
- Earlier, the magistrate entered a stock "Delay Reduction Order" stating a magistrate "may perform any function in this case" (except preside over a jury trial).
- The magistrate denied the motion to compel arbitration as unenforceable, noting the order was "issued with the consent of the parties," despite no written consent or objection from defendants.
- Defendants appealed, arguing the Delay Reduction Order did not satisfy C.R.M. 5(g) notice requirements and thus silence could not be treated as consent; the Court of Appeals agreed.
- The court reversed the magistrate’s denial for lack of jurisdiction under C.R.M. 6(c)(2) and remanded for proceedings before a judge or a magistrate after adequate notice and consent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the magistrate had jurisdiction under C.R.M. 6(c)(2) to decide a motion (dismiss/compel arbitration) that requires party consent | Andrews: Silence to the Delay Reduction Order constitutes consent to magistrate functions | Defendants: The Delay Reduction Order did not provide the required C.R.M. 5(g) notice, so silence is not consent | Held: Magistrate lacked jurisdiction; C.R.M. 6(c)(2) requires consent and it was not validly obtained |
| Whether the Delay Reduction Order satisfied C.R.M. 5(g) (written notice that parties must consent to magistrate performing particular functions) | Andrews: Cited C.R.M. 3(f)(1)(A)(ii) — failure to object within 14 days deems consent to referral | Defendants: The order said a magistrate "may" perform functions and did not state consent was required or identify specific functions | Held: Order was ambiguous and insufficient under C.R.M. 5(g); it failed to state that parties must consent to the specific functions |
| Whether C.R.M. 7(a) (review of magistrate orders entered without consent) applied | Andrews: argued magistrate could rely on Delay Reduction Order and C.R.M. 7(a) was inapplicable if consent existed | Defendants: C.R.M. 7(a) governs review when consent is not required; here consent was required and not given | Held: C.R.M. 7(a) inapplicable because the challenged function required consent under C.R.M. 6(c)(1)/(2); jurisdictional issue resolved by C.R.M. 5(g) analysis |
Key Cases Cited
- Bryan v. Neet, 85 P.3d 556 (Colo. App. 2003) (whether consent is required depends on rule/statute, not parties’ actual consent)
- People ex rel. Garner v. Garner, 33 P.3d 1239 (Colo. App. 2001) (describes C.R.M. 7(a) review for orders entered without required consent)
- Feldewerth v. Joint Sch. Dist., 3 P.3d 467 (Colo. App. 2000) (notice requirement can be jurisdictional and must be enforced)
- FirstBank-Longmont v. Bd. of Equalization, 990 P.2d 1109 (Colo. App. 1999) (apply plain meaning of rule language)
- Stamp v. Vail Corp., 172 P.3d 437 (Colo. 2007) (interpretation of "any" as "all" in statutory language)
- People v. Dist. Court, 953 P.2d 184 (Colo. 1998) ("may" can indicate possibility rather than permission)
- In re S.O., 795 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1990) (clarity of consent/waiver forms is critical)
- Marks v. Koch, 284 P.3d 118 (Colo. App. 2012) (read related provisions together and harmonize rules)
- Brooks v. Zabka, 450 P.2d 653 (Colo. 1969) (definite article "the" particularizes and limits the subject)